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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the lower court erred in finding that the

Clearfield City Council and Clearfield City Planning
Coiranission had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and without
basis in fact in denying a conditional|use permit to the
plaintiff Davis County.
2.

Whether the lower court committed reversible error

in finding that Clearfield City unconstitutionally applied
Section 11 Chapter 12 of the Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance
in violation of Section 7 and Section (24 of Article I of the

Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
At the time Plaintiff applied for a conditional use permit
Clearfield City had enacted a zoning ordinance which contained
the administration and procedures for conditional use permits
as well as provided for various zones throughout the city.
Section 11, Chapter 2 and Section 11, Chapter 12 of the then
existing Clearfield City Ordinances are pertinent to this
appeal and are attached herein as part of the Appendix.

It

should be noted, however, that these ordinances were substantially revised in the fall of 1984 and therefore the present
ordinances include substantial changes.

Reference will be

made to these changes when appropriate during the Argument
portion of the Brief but verbatim duplication of these revised
ordinances is not required.
A state statute relating to residential facilities for
handicapped persons as contained in Section 10-9-2.5, U.C.A.
is also included as an addendum to this Brief.

While such

statute is not directly in point there are certain portions
of the statute which can be utilized by analogy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
On June 25, 1934 Plaintiff-Respondent Davis County made
application with defendant-appellant Clearfield City for a
conditional use permit to operate a "residential treatment
-2-

program for adolescents and adults experiencing substance
abuse and mental illness.11

A hearing was held on July 18,

19 84 before the Clearfield City Planning Commission.

The

Commission in a three to one vote denied the application.
Subsequently the plaintiff appealed to the Clearfield City
Council.
A public meeting was held on Septeijnber 11, 1984 and
continued until October 9, 1984.

The C ity Council voted to

uphold the decision of the Planning Commission to deny the
conditional use permit.

Suit was commenced in the District

Court of Davis County on November 7, 19^4 alleging that the
actions of the Clearfield City Council bnd its Planning
Commission were both unconstitutional and arbitrary and
capricious.
The matter was tried to the Honora|ble Douglas L. Cornaby
on April 24 and April 25 of 1986.

The court issued a memorandum

decision on May 28, 19 86 ruling in favojr of the plaintiff and
ordering that a writ of mandamus be iss|ued requiring Clearfield
City to issue a conditional use permit.!

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law were signed on May 2 , 1986.

Thereafter,

Defendants' request for a stay of execution was denied and
Appellants filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 23, 1986
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There have been two forums in whidh the evidence in this
case has been gathered.

First, the proceedings before the

Clearfield City Planning Commission an^ City Council and
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second the testimony given before the District Court.

In

reviewing this case this Court must conduct its own independent
review of the City's actions considering both the evidence
before the City Council and Planning Commission as well as
additional evidence introduced before the District Court
which is relevant to the issues considered by the City.
Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d
(Utah 1984).
For this reason, therefore, the facts in this case will
be presented in chronological sequence based both upon the
events occuring before the City officials and the testimony
given in the District Court.

No attempt will be made to

identify additional evidence which was introduced at trial
(relevant to the issues considered by the City) but which was
not actually presented during the City proceedings.

Appellant

represents, however, that this type of evidence is minimal
and that the overwhelming majority of the evidence given during
the lower court proceeding was also given to the City officials.
THE EXISTING ADDICTION RECOVERY CENTER (ARC)
In 19 81 Davis County through its executive director of
the Davis County Mental Health Department applied for a
conditional use permit to allow the construction of a
facility known as the Addiction Recovery Center (ADC).

At

that time, Dr. Williams represented to the Planning Commission
that he had no reason nor any intention to request any other
similar facilities in the same area.

-4-

(Tr. 323).

At that time an adjoining property owner Victor Smith was
very much opposed to the building of this facility•

(Tr. 42-4 3)

The ARC was constructed in 19 81 and treats adults who are
experiencing or recovering from chemical addiction.

(Tr. 72).

The testimony was consistent that this facility had caused no
problems during its years of operation, was maintained in a
clean and efficient manner, and had a gtood reputation in the
community for its operation.

(Tr. 43, 142, 334-36) .

Since 19 79 the area in which this ARC facility is located
is zoned PO which stands for Professional Offices.

(Tr. 137,

101-102) .
THE 19 84 APPLICATION FOR A NEWI FACILITY
In the spring of 19 84 the county a|bproached Mr. Victor
Smith about acquiring his property for a new facility.

It

had been determined by the mental health officials that this
area of the county was in need of a new facility in that
particular area.

After several refusals Mr. Smith decided to

sell to the county for this purpose.

(|Tr. 42) .

Mr. Smith's property is adjacent to the existing ARC
facility with a vacant lot in between.

(Tr. 139). His

property was appraised for $230,000 butt he agreed to sell it
to the county for $205,000 cash.

The offer was made subject

to approval by the Clearfield City zoning officials.

(Tr.

153-54).
Dr. Williams stated that after he had signed this earnest
money agreement with Mr. Smith he met with the Clearfield City
planning officials to discuss the proposed facility.
-5-

He was

told that for a new facility to be approved it would have to
be classified as a conditional use allowance under a "convalescent center" exception and that it would have to be
submitted to the Clearfield City Planning Commission.

(Tr. 20).

On June 26, 1984 an application was made for the new
facility.

(Plaintiff's Ex. 1 ) . Attachment A to the applica-

tion summarizes the proposed use for the Smith residence.

It

stated the following:
Existing home to be utilized as a boarding house
and convalescent center.
To be utilized by Davis County Mental Health Center
as a residential treatment program for adolescents and
adults experiencing substance abuse and mental illness.
Length of stay:

average 90-120 days.

Type of people admitted: Those individuals in the
Level 3 phase of treatment. Level 1 being in-patient
treatment, Level 2 being comprehensive treatment, Level
3 being structured living environment, Level 4 being
out-patient services.
Level 3 individuals would need a minimum of supervision and would be working or actively engaged in the
community during the stay. Support group and group
therapy would also be provided at the facility, as well
as day treatment.
Staff will be located on the premises 24 hours
per day. (Plaintiff's Ex. 1 ) .
MEETING OF THE CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING COMMISSION ON JULY
18, 1984
Dr. Williams attended a Clearfield City Planning Commission
hearing on July 18, 19 84.

The minutes of that meeting were

introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.

At the meeting Dr.

Williams stated that the facility would house sixteen to eighteen
individuals with half being adults and half being adolescents
-6-

twelve years of age or older.

He statedJ the facility would

be used for mental health, alcohol rehabilitation and drug
abuse.

(Plaintifffx Ex. 3; Tr. 21). DrL Williams testified

that the hearing took around two and a half hours at which time
he presented various documents to the commissioners.

A large

number of people from the community were in attendance.

(Tr.

20). He stated that there were many individuals throughout
the county who were in need of this typ^ of help to improve
their health and well-being.

He asserted that this type of

facility would contribute to the general well-being of the
community.

(Tr. 22) .

He recalled that he addressed all cpf the concerns of those
present.

As to parking, for example, h^ agreed to purchase the
:

vacant lot in between the existing ARC
house to provide additional parking.

acility and the Smith

CJTr. 23) . As to increased

crime he produced several letters from various police departments which stated that they had not had any increase in crime
as a result of these type of facilities)

(Ex. 6, Tr. 26) .

Officer Bill Nelson of the Clearfield CctLty Police Department
explained to the commissioners that he did not believe the
proposed facility would increase the crldlime rate but that it
could cause future problems.

(Plaintifffs Ex. 3; Tr. 25)

Some of the adjoining property owners, according to Dr. Williams,
voiced their concern that the new facility would lower their
property values.

No real estate apprai sers were present to

give any official information.

(Tr. 30)

Dr. Williams acknowledged that the)re were numerous views
-7-

and opinions represented in the meeting and that there was
a lengthy period of time in which all individuals were given
an opportunity to express themselves during the meeting.
76).

(Tr.

Many of these people expressed their concern that they

did not want to change the residential nature of the neighborhood, that they were fearful about dangers being presented
with a second facility and were worried about property values.
These types of perceptions, according to Dr. Williams, are
consistent with the perceptions of other people throughout
the country as to these kinds of facilities.

(Tr. 32-33).

Finally, there was considerable discussion about the
location of the facility directly across the street from a
junior high school.

Several sepakers voiced their concern

that this junior high presence would have a negative impact
on the young individuals in the treatment program who were
being placed in close proximity where drug trafficking was
available.

(Tr. 32).

Wilford Summerkorn related how he was employed by Davis
County but was also the Clearfield City Planner under a contract
arrangement between the County and the City.

(Tr. 9 8-99) .

He stated that he prepared a report for the Planning Commission
after investigating the application of the County.

He submitted

this report to the Planning Commission on the evening of the
hearing.

A portion of that report states the following:

A question that has been raised by some is the
appropriateness of having two such facilities located
so close together. Land uses of this type are often
viewed as being somewhat undesirable for a variety
of reasons, most of them personal reasons of home
-8-

owners in their vicinity. Undesirable land uses
can be located in communities in one of two ways:
they can be grouped together to minimize the impact
on other areas of the community, though they may
then more severely impact the area ithey are located
in, or they may be spread throughout the city to
lessen the impact in any one location and "share
the wealth", so to speak.
The only guide or precedence that Clearfield
may have as to what policy to foil'|>w would be the
regulations for residential facili ;ies for the
handicapped. Handicapped faciliti< >s and mental
health facilties are far from iden* :ical, but some
of the impacts may be similar. CI Garfield1 s
regulations for the handicapped fa< :ilities require
that no two facilities be located :loser than one
mile from each other. This, then, tends to follow
the idea of disbursing such facili :ies throughout
the community rather than concentr. tting them.
There are some important differences in this
case, however. The mental health facility will be
located in an office area, rather than in a residential
area, residents do exist immediately adjacent to this
site, however. (Plaintiff's Ex. 1]7) .
Mr. Summerkorn stated that in his topinion this particular
usage would not have been detrimental at that location.

He

stated that there were other sites in tpe city that were equally
suitable from a planning standpoint for this type of site
including areas along Main or State Street and near the North
Davis Hospital.

(Tr. 109). Mr. Summerkorn also recalled the

concern about the proximity to the junior high school and
the statements made concerning several (incidences which occurred
between the existing ARC facility and tdhe junior high school
students.

(Tr. 110-11).

Mr. Summerkorn believed that addi-

tional information was presented to thq City Council in the
later meetings which was not presented at the initial zoning
commission meeting.

(Tr. 123).
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Mr. Summerkorn concluded by noting that in his opinion
the use of this facility could have been approved by the
Zoning Commission but on the other hand it could also have been
denied.

There was conflicting information about property values,

density of these type of facilities, and the impact on the
junior high school.

(Tr. 128).

Vern Hamblin is a member of the Clearfield City Planning
Commission and had been for eight years at the time of the
hearing.

Mr. Hamblin made a motion to the commission that

the permit be denied.

The motion was carried with three members

voting to deny the permit and one voting in favor of it.

He

voted against the addition of this facility for several reasons
including the perceived fear of the residents which lived in
the area about these type of additional facilities, future
congestion with having two facilities together, and the proximity
of the junior high school to the proposed facility.

(Tr. 303-07) .

Mr. Hamblin acknowledged that there was no direct testimony that
the new facility would cause any increase in the crime rate
but noted that it could cause possible future problems.
(Tr. 304). He also admitted that there was no actual impact
study made on property values nor was anyone from the junior
high invited to appear at the hearing to give their opinion.
(Tr. 312-14).

He also acknowledged that he did not know the

history of any incidences between the patients in the existing
ARC facility and the junior high students but stated that
this history was not as relevant since the present facility
did not have juveniles in it.
-10-

(Tr. 317-20).

Ivan Anderson explained that in 19^4 he was both the
Chairman of the Zoning Commission and a|so a member of the
Clearfield City Council.

As Chairman ot

Commission he had no vote.

the Planning

(Tr. 322) . Ife recalled that at

the two-hour meeting there was much discussion by the people
present concerning a variety of issues including the older
citizens who were afraid of the impact ^n additional facility
would have on their property.

There wap also discussion as

to what effect these two facilities woufld have as to the
density of the area, the compatibility pf one facility being
for adults while the other for youth, and the relationship
between the junior high and the proposed facility.

(Tr. 325).

After the Planning Commission had denied the application Mr.
Anderson met with Dr. Williams and another council member
and told him that he was against the new facility because of
the density of adding two facilities ir} the same location
and because of Dr. Williams1 prior representation that no other
facilities would be requested in that ^rea.

(Tr. 327-28) .

CITY COUNCIL MEETING SEPTEMBER 11, 1984
The County through its Executive director filed an appeal
to the Clearfield City Council requesting that the conditional
use permit be granted.

A public hearing was held before the

Clearfield City Council as reflected by the official minutes
introduced i~to evidence.

(Plaintiff£ Ex. 10). In addition,

a secretary for the Davis County Mental Health Department
recorded the entire meeting and subsequently transcribed the
proceedings.

This transcription was admitted into evidence.
-11-

(Plaintifffs Ex. 12).
Essentially much of the same information that had been
received during the zoning commission was resubmitted during
this hearing.

The Davis County Mental Health Department

through its county attorney and others requested the City to
specifically list why the zoning commission had denied the
previous request for a conditional use application.
response was received from the zoning commission.

No
(Tr. 34-35) .

The meeting before the City Council also lasted approximately two hours.

(Tr. 35). Dr. Williams explained the type

of treatment which would be utilized in the proposed facility
as well as the composition of the patients.

He emphasized

that this would not be a facility to teach the mentally
retarded but to assist the mental health of various individuals
with problems such as alcohol addiction, drug abuse, depression,
and stress.

The residents would be substance free before they

reached this phase of treatment.

He stated that some of the

people in the facility would be under court supervision but
that the majority would be there on their own accord.

(Plain-

tiff's Ex. 10; Tr. 74). At this meeting discussion centered
around the potential dangerousness of these people, the compatibility with the residential atmosphere and the feared
reduction of property values.

Additional questions were also

asked about the mental health budget and about the county's
ability to pay for the facility.

(Tr. 6 2 ) .

Shirley Reed, a councilwoman for Clearfield City, stated
that she had previously attended the Planning Commission meeting
-12-

having been asked to attend by some of llier constituents
(Tr. 160). During the interim between the two meetings Mrs
Reed obtained a document from the American Planning Association entitled "The Effect of Group Care Facilities on Property
Values.f"

This document was referred to by her in the September

11 meeting.

(Plaintifffs Ex. 10; Plainfcifffs Ex. 18; Tr. 163)

It was her opinion that these studies showed that concentrated density of group homes has ari| impact on the characterization of property and their value ^nd it was recommended
I
that planners look at disbursing the fapilities rather than
putting them in a clustering area.

Whilie there were six studies

contained in the report Mrs. Reed focusled upon one done in
Oakland, California in 198 3 since the t|ype of group home population involved was identical to that proposed by Davis County
namely persons with mental health problems, alcohol problems
and drug problems.

Councilwoman Reed noted that she had done

a lot of research on her own during this interim period and had
gone to the library to examine these studies.

She received a

copy of the Wolch Study from the University of Southern
California which had examined the Oakland, California situation.
The memorandum from the APA Planning Advisory Service
was generally favorable to the placement of group homes and
noted that fears normally expressed as [to increased criminal
activities and de :reased property values are not well founded
In summarizing the Oakland, California study the report stated:
Stuart Gabriel and Jennifer wolch evaluated the
impact of human service facilities upon property
values in the most recent study oiji this issue. Human
-13-

service facilities were defined as halfway houses
and group homes for populations with mental health,
alcohol and drug problems. From their research, the
authors discovered a relationship between different
types of group care facilities and surrounding
property values. Both juvenile and adult residential
facilities adversely affected prices. Furthermore,
the strength and impact of this effect was greater
from facilities for adults than from those for
juveniles. Therefore, this study runs counter to
the mainstream of past research, which discounts
the notion of a negative association between group
care facilities and the neighboring property values.
(Plaintiff's Ex. 18).
Councilwoman Reed admitted that this study involved a
ghetto type of situation in California which was not present
in Clearfield but still maintained that the results on property
values was analogous because of the similar type of facility
in the study.

(Tr. 175-76) .

Don W. Baird is the City Manager of Clearfield who has a
bachelorfs degree in planning emphasis and a master's degree
in public administration.

He had worked for two years with the

Ogden Redevelopment Agency and ten years with the City of Orem
as a senior planner. (Tr. 217).
Mr. Baird stated that after the County had been denied
the application by the Planning Commission, he became involved
in setting up a hearing before the City Council.

Prior to the

meeting he conducted research in planning journals and also
reviewed legal cases from the Utah Supreme Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court.

He spoke with some of the people in the planning

staff and also with Dr. Williams.

He was contacted by several

individuals in the neighborhood about their concerns.
220-223) .
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(Tr.

At the hearing on September 21 Mr. Baird recalled that he
did not make any specific recommendation to the City Council
but merely repeated what the Planning Commission had recommended.
He told them that in his opinion, with tphe information that had
been supplied, they could either approve the application or deny
it.

He did not attempt to influence th^m in either direction.

(Tr. 223). When asked as to his personal opinion of the appropriateness of this site he stated that he believed the home
was appropriate for such a facility.

H<pwever, because it was

immediately adjacent to the existing facility which provided
the same type of service for a different segment of the population that this was not an appropriate! site because of the
increased impact upon the surrounding neighborhood.

(Tr. 25 3).

In other words, the Victor Smith property was an appropriate
property for this facility Tiad it not bleen next to the present
existing facility.

(Tr. 254).

He explained that by doubling the size of the facility
an adverse impact on the surrounding neighborhood occurs which
affects the quality of life of those persons.

Quality of life

includes noise, traffic generation, density, and the perception
of people living in the area.

He statqd that if a little old

lady who lives in the surrounding neighborhood is scared to
death and has to continually lock her doors and windows and is
afraid to go out at night because of the existence of the
facility that such fear is a real factor even if the woman's
perception is based entirely upon fals^ premises.

(Tr. 259).

At the conclusion of the public hearing a motion was made
-15-

to continue the public hearing until October 9 at 7:15 p.m.
"so that the Council can study all research available and get
a legal opinion concerning the conditional use permit."
(Plaintiff's Ex. 10). After the meeting Mr. Baird, the city
manager, was directed by the Council to make a study of the
area as to other social services being provided as well as to
get more information from Davis County Mental Health on questions
which were still in the mind of the council members.

(Tr.

204, 329). Mr. Baird stated that the additional questions
centered around the types of facilities located in different
communities, the various stages of treatment which were occurring
in the county, as well as a breakdown of which facilities were
in commercial uses and which were in residential uses.

The

Council wanted to know about all the facilities within a
one mile radius and also what facilities were located in Layton.
(Tr. 226) .
ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BY CITY OFFICIALS
Between the September 11 meeting and the proposed October
9 meeting Mr. Baird contacted Dr. Williams concerning certain
of the questions asked by the City Council.

Exhibit 16 is a

response given by the County dated October 1, 19 84.

The

questions concerned the definitions of levels being treated at
each home in Bountiful, Farmington, Layton, and Clearfield as
well as the total number of persons being treated for various
types of social needs.

In addition, the study showed percentages

of persons being treated with alcohol or drug related problems
within the last thirty days.

Finally, the study showed the

-16-

Davis County Mental Health budget.
In addition, Mr. Baird prepared twq maps to address the
concerns of the Council.

Exhibit 1 was obtained from the

Clearfield City Building Department and is a topography aerial
map of the area around the applicant site.

The aerial photo

was taken in 1984 and the markings on thf€e map were made by Mr.
Baird.

On the map Mr. Baird identified areas which he believed

could be called neighborhoods.

He admitted it was discretionary

but was based upon his experience as to iwhat neighborhoods
would be affected by the new facility.

The purpose of the map

was to identify the neighborhood where the impact would be
greatest if the present ARC facility wa$ doubled in size.
(Tr. 232-33).
Based upon his assessment of that heighborhood he concluded that the existing ARC facility included about 5% of
the land area and that if the vacant lot to be used as a parking
lot together with the Victor Smith property were to be included
then these combined facilities would constitute 11% of the
area.

(Tr. 2 34).

In addition he prepared a map showing the

various city zones and the location of pasic social services
within a one mile diameter.

(Plaintiff! s Ex. 3 ) . He identified

on this map the Pioneer School which isj a facility for vocational training for the mentally handicapped, the existing ARC
facility, the Clearfield Convalescent Center and the Division
of Family Services Center.
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THE OCTOBER 9, 1984 CITY COUNCIL MEETING AND
ITS PRE-MEETING
As was customary with the City Council the members met
in a conference room approximately one hour prior to the
beginning of the public hearing.

While these meetings are

open to the public no one is specifically invited to attend.
The pre-meeting is noticed, however, in the agenda for that
evening.

(Tr. 211)-.

Councilman Anderson stated that during the pre-meeting
Mr. Baird presented a map as well as the information given to
him by Davis County Mental Health.

(Tr. 329-331) .

During

this pre-meeting Mr. Anderson stated that the Council was
shown Exhibit 1 by Mr. Baird and that the discussion lasted
about five or ten minutes.

There was no discussion regarding

how the individual members would vote and Mr. Anderson stated
his surprise that Mrs. Reed voted against the site since she
seemed to be in favor of it at the pre-meeting.

(Tr. 345).

Mr. Baird testified that he informed the Council as to
his findings and disbursed information to them given to him
by the Davis County Mental Health Department.

There was no

decision made relative by the group as a whole as to how they
were going to vote. He stated it was quite the contrary since
at least three of the council members commented that it was
a very sensitive issue and that they had strong feelinqs both
ways.

Mr. Baird did not make any recommendation either for

or against the application.

(Tr. 243-44) .

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 is the official Clearfield City
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Council Meeting Minutes of October 9, 1384.

Plaintifffs

Exhibit 13 is the transcript which was nfiade by the Plaintiff.
The transcript shows that Councilwoman Reed stated her concern
that the City of Clearfield had been responsive to the
community!s and county's special needs ipy the establishment
of other facilities.

She noted that in choosing the location

for these type of facilities the density of integration should
be examined since there is an impact upon property values.

She

expressed her concern of locating a second group facility in
this area where 11% of the neighborhood would involve this
type of property.

She also stated, according to the transcript:

As an elected official I feel that it is my
responsibility in upholding the majjster plan and
of those planning ordinances, just as I would carefully consider say three Artie Circles being in the
verv same area. This would not bei good to the
original businesses. And I feel that from my
charters that an elected official is to minimize
the impact of the changes to the characteristics
of that particular neighborhood and I feel that
another residential group care facility at this
particular location at 904 South state Street
would actually maximize the impact rather than
minimize it. (Plaintiff's Ex. 13 J p. 3 ) .
Councilwoman Reed then made a motion to uphold the decision
of the Planning Commission.
between the members.

Further discussion then occurred

It was brought out that between the

September 11 meeting and that evening the Council had approved
a new ordinance for zoning.

The area now proposed was in a

CI zone rather than a PO zone

Greater flexibility under the

new ordinance was provided for these type of facilities.
Additional discussion occurred between the councilmen
and Dr. Williams as to the best location for this type of
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facility.

Councilman Anderson stated:

I am against two of them being right together
and taking up 11% of the ground. I am against that
and I don't think that we, and I don't know how you
feel, that we should be stimied with or have that
put on us that we are against that type of facility
and I think it needs to be done and should be done
but I don't think there should be two of them
together. (Plaintiff's Ex. 13, p. 1 0 ) .
The minutes of the meeting reflect three reasons why the
permit was denied.

First, that Clearfield City has been

responsive to the special needs of these types of persons by
supporting four other facilities in the community all within
less than a one mile radius; second, even the most favorable
studies of group care facilities indicates that facilities
should be disbursed to lessen the impact to property owners
and that since a staff survey indicates 11% of the surveyed
area would be dedicated to group care facilities this would
result in too high a density for this particular location and
third, as elected officials it is the responsibility of the
council to insure the characteristics of the neighborhoods
are minimized and that this new facility would maximize the
impact on the area's homes, churches and schools.

(Plaintiff's

Ex. 11, p. 2 ) .
SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVE CITES BY CITY COUNCIL
After the vote, the Council instructed Mr. Baird to find
alternative sites for this type of facility (Tr. 287). A
discussion occurred between Council members and the Davis
County Mental Health people.

One of the council members

indicated that this vote did not mean that the City was opposed
-20-

to the facility although it was their opinion the City had
certainly met its obligation to provide these type of
facilities.

The councilmen said they cqmld continue to

provide these services and asked Mr, Baird to identify
areas where a facility would be more appropriate.

Mr. Baird

told Dr. Williams that he would provide him with a map
outlining areas that would be more appropriate for this
facility.
About a week later he gave him a m&p which showed three
sites in the same zoning area and two in an additional area.
(Tr. 249-251).

These proposed sites included areas in a

residential zone since the new zoning ordinances permitted
these type of facilities as a conditional use in any residential
zone within the City.

(Tr. 247-49).

Mr. Baird told Dr. Williams that i \fi his opinion all five
of these locations had a good chance of getting approval since
the Council had directed him to identify them.

(Tr. 250).

Councilwoman Reed was asked during the Itrial whether the Council
would approve one of the three residential proposals if Dr.
Williams decided to put a facility there.

She responded that

the City Council would look very favorably upon these facilities
since they were suggested by the City Manager.

(Tr. 196).

Mr. Anderson also expressed his view that the Council would
look very favorably at these sites because they were selected
by the City and because they were not placinq two facilities
together.

(Tr. 354) .
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SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL OF LIKE FACILITIES
Shortly after the October 9 hearing Dr. Williams approached
Mr. Baird about building on one of these proposed sites.

Mr.

Baird thought Dr. Williams was talking about the same facility
proposed on the Smith property but later learned it was different.
The new plan called for a residential health care facility
which would treat long-term mentally ill people who had various
problems of depression or problems with their families.

Dr.

Williams explained that this was different from that proposed
on the Smith location and was not sponsored by the Davis County
Mental Health.

The site was approved by the City Council even

though there was a much more organized and vocal group of
residents living in the Valahalla subdivision who opposed
placement of this facility.

(Tr. 251-52) .

In addition, a second facility has been built on one of
these sites by the Davis County Family Support Center.
facility houses children on a short-term basis.

This

It was

approved by the City Council in November of 19 86.
Under the present ordinances which have now been adopted
by Clearfield City and which were in effect shortly after the
October hearing of 1984 a facility such as that proposed by
the plaintiff would qualify as a "public or quasi-public11 use
or as a "convalescent home."

As such, a conditional use permit

c^uld be granted in any of the residential areas of the city
together with the Cl and C2 commercial zones.
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(Tr. 133).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The lower court erred in findiitg the decision of the

Clearfield City Council to be arbitrary land capricious and
without any rational basis in fact.

The standard of appellate

review requires this Court as well as the District Court to
examine the decision of the administrative agency in light of
evidence and not in light of whether the decision is the same
one which would be made by the court.

The lower court dis-

counted all of the reasons given for th^ denial of the permit
as unjustified and instead substituted its own opinion that
the facility should be allowed.
As a conditional use there was no tight to place this
facility at the proposed site.

The purpose of conditional

uses is to allow flexibility of planning organizations in
deciding where services which are beneficial to the
community should be located. The City Council obviously did
not decide to exclude this type of facility from the city but
merely decided to place it in another location which was not
immediately adjacent to an existing fac ility.
While it is certainly easy to argue a contrary position
that it is better to place the two facilities together the
evidence is overwhelming that the City fcouncil made this
decision on a rational basis and with substantial evidence
to support it.

As such, therefore, it- cannot be said to be

arbitrary or capricious and was based i^pon substantial facts.
2.

The Clearfield City Council did not unconstitutionally

apply Section 11, Chapter 12 of the Clearfield Zoning Ordinance
-23-

in violation of Section 7 and Section 24 of Article I of the
Utah State Constitution and Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

It is doubtful

that the lower court made this decision in the first place
since its memorandum decision does not in any way reflect a
finding of unconstitutional conduct.

However, since the Court

did sign the Findings and Conclusions which stated this result
this matter must be addressed.

The decisions relied upon by

the County in the lower court are inapplicable to the present
situation since these type of facilities have not been uniformly
excluded by the Clearfield City officials.

The new ordinances

have greatly expanded the available locations for these type
of facilities.

The location of existing facilities of this

nature eliminate any argument of a constitutional deprivation.
In addition, while some classes of persons may be constitutionally protected to a higher degree than others the courts
have yet afforded this protection to programs involving alcohol
and drug abuse.

This type of facility is not analogous to a

mental retardation center or mental handicap centers which are
referred to in the cases relied upon by the County in the
lower court.

A city such as Clearfield is certainly entitled

to decide where these type of facilities should be located
for the protection of both the residents of the facility and
the residents of the city.

As such, therefore, there has

been no violation of either the United States of the Utah
Constitutions.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DECISION OF THE CLEARFIELD CITY
COUNCIL WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND
WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT.
Before arguing the merits of this cfase it is well to
review the standard of appellate scrutiny which is applicable
to this case as well as the status of a conditional use permit,
A.

Neither This Court Nor the Lo^er Court May
Substitute Its Judgment for tlfte Judgment of
the Clearfield City Council.

This Court on numerous occasions his defined the role
of the judiciary in reviewing decisions of municipalities
concerning zoning matters.

This Court has stated:

In reviewing of zoning cases the function
of the court is narrow and its scope is limited to
a determination of whether or not the action of the
board of county commissioners as a legislative body
is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious.
. . . . The prior decisions of this Court without
exception have laid down the rule -chat the exercise
of the zoning power is a legislative function to be
exercised by the legislative bodies of the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning plan, its
necessity, the nature and boundaries of the district
to be zoned are matters which lie solely within that
discretion. It is the policy of tlfiis Court as
ennunciated in its prior decisions that it will avoid
substituting its judgment for that of the legislative
body of the municipality. Crestvifew Holladay Home
Owners Assn., Inc. v. Engh Floral (po. , 545 P.2d 1150,
1152 (Utah 1976) .
In a more recent case this Court a iso stated the rule
relating to presumption of validity by a governing body.
This Court stated:
This Court has consistently he Id that due to
the complexity of factors involved in the matters
-25-

of zoning, as in other fields where courts review
the actions of administrative bodies, it should be
assumed that those charged with that responsibility
[the board] have specialized knowledge in that field.
Accordingly, they should be allowed a comparatively
wide latitude of discretion; and their actions endowed
with the presumption of correctness and validity
which the court should not interfere with unless
it is shown that there is no reasonable basis to
justify the action taken. Cottonwood Heights
Citizens Assn. v. Board of Commissioners, 593 P.2d
140 (Utah 1979).
Finally, in reviewing a municipal body decision which
has been previously reviewed by a lower court an appellate court
must weigh the reasonableness of the administrative body's
actions independently of the lower court's finding.

In

reviewing the zoning decisions of local governing authorities,
the appellate court must conduct an independent examination of
the local authority's decision "without according any special
deference to the same review conducted by the trial court."
Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865,
868 (Minn. 1979).
As noted by the Court of Appeals of Minnesota the lower
court's opinion can be utilized by this Court in its review
but such use is limited.

That Court stated:

This is not to say that the District Court's
decision is to be given no weight whatsoever.
The District Court's opinion should be given such
weight as is given to persuasive precedent or
authority from other jurisdictions, and we must
give due deference to its ability to judge the
credibility of witnesses. Beyond this, however,
we must conduct our own independent review of the
county board's decision, considering both evidence
before the county board and additional evidence
introduced before the District Court which is
relevant to the issues considered by the county
board. City of Barnum v. County of Carlton, 357 N.W.2d
676 (Minn. App. 1983)
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See also, Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment! of Salt Lake City,
685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984); Leschi Improvement Council v
State Highway Commission, 525 P.2d 774 ([Wash. 2d 1974).
Appellant submits that applying tnils standard to the
instant case can produce only one result:

namely, a reversal

of the lower court's decision and an affirmance of the
decision of the Clearfield City Council [to deny the conditional use permit.
B.

A Conditional Use Permit Vest^ Discretion
With a Municipality as to Whether a Proposed
Use is Appropriate for the Prqposed Site.

It is important to remember in this case that the plaintiff
sought to utilize the Smith home as a rehabilitation center
under the terms of the Clearfield City Ordinances allowing for
conditional uses.

In other words, the proposed operation of

the facility was not a permitted use under these ordinances.
The distinction between a conditional use and a permitted use
was made by the Court of Appeals of Oregon.

That Court stated

By providing that a given use(will only be
allowed conditionally in a given zone, a local
government finds that there is a possible public
need for that use in that zone, ancjl simultaneously
finds that introduction of that usi into that zone
may have disadvantages that outweigh the advantages.
While an outright permitted use can be constructed
without seeking or obtaining any further discretionary permission from planning or zoning officials,
a conditional use cannot be constructed without: (1)
applying for a permit, (2) which leads to a quasijudicial hearing, and (3) the granting of a permit,
based upon a discretionary decision by planning
officials that the advantages of the specific proposed
conditional use outweigh the disadvantages. Anderson
v. Peden, 569 P.2d 633, 637 (Ore. App. 1977).
The Court then went on to discuss the standards to be
-27-

applied in reviewing a conditional use application.

The

Court stated:
In theory, notification would ideally be
accomplished by filling out all relevant standards
in copius detail in the zoning ordinance. And
it may be that passing on a conditional use application in the total absence of standards would be
improper. But the very nature of a conditional
use in land use planning makes detailed and
specific standards impossible. The granting or
denial of a conditional use is a highly discretionary act. Important and relevant considerations
may vary from one neighborhood to another, and from
one year to another. Id. at 6 38.
Section 11-2-4.5 of the then existing Clearfield City
Ordinances defined the standards to be utilized in determining
whether a conditional use permit is granted.

That ordinance

states:
The planning commission shall not authorize
a conditional use permit unless evidence is
presented to establish:
(a) That the proposed use of the particular
location is necessary or desirable to provide a
service or facility which will contribute to the
general well-being of the community, and;
(b) That such use will not, under the circumstances of a particular case and the conditions
imposed, be detrimental to the health, safety
and general welfare of persons or injurious to
property and improvements in the community, but
will be compatible with and complimentary to the
existing surrounding uses, buildings and structures
when considering but not limited to, effect on
adjacent property values, traffic, esthetics,
pollution, parking, landscaping, location of
structure on parcel and signs;
(c) That the proposed use wil 1 comply with
the regulations and conditions specified in this
ordinance for such use; and
(d) That the proposed use conforms to the
goals, policies, intent, and governinq principals
of the Clearfield City Master Plan.
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Again, a review of this conditional! use criteria shows
that the City Council and its Planning Commission is
authorized a great deal of discretion in deciding whether
the advantages of a proposed facility outweigh its disadvantages.

As will be seen in the following section while

opinions can certainly differ as to the merits of placing
this type of facility at the Smith house location there is
ample justification for the Commission In deciding not to
grant the application for the conditional use permit. Such
decision was neither arbitrary, capricicpus or without basis
of fact.
C.

The Decision of the Clearfield City Council
and the Clearfield City Planning Commission
to Deny a Conditional Use Permit to the
Plaintiff was Based Upon Rational Reasons
and Was Not, Arbitrary or Capricious.

As noted earlier, in order to overturn the decision of the
City Council the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
decision is without any rational basis, and was arbitrary and
capricious.

The lower court discounted all of the reasons

given for denying the application and gave validity to all of
the reasons presented by Plaintiff for granting it.

Defendants

do not dispute that a decision maker co Lid conclude a facilitv
on the Smith property would be in the best interest of the
community and that the conditional use permit should be granted,
However, as has been stated earlier thel question in this appeal
is whether the decision of the City Council, as the legal
decision maker in this case, was based on a rational and
justifiable basis.
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A number of reasons were presented at the hearings and
at the trial for denying this permit.

Defendants submit that

as long as any of these reasons either by themselves or in
conjunction with others provide a rational basis for denial
then the decision of the lower court must be reversed.

There

is no authority which states that an applicant is entitled
to a conditional use permit unless there is a preponderance of
evidence against him or a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
decision makers.

On the contrary, the decision making body is

vested with a large amount of discretion and their decision
will be affirmed as long as there is any basis to conclude
that the decision was reasonable based upon the facts and
circumstances presented.
442 F.2d 847 (B.C.

Brawner Building, Inc. v. Shehyn,

Cir. 1971).

Before proceeding to examine the reasons given for denial
of this permit it is necessary to examine the use and the status
this facility should be afforded.

The proposed use according to

Dr. Williams was to provide a transitional facility where
patients could stay for 90 to 120 days in a treatment program
before entering the community on an out-patient basis.

Both

juveniles and adults would be placed in this facility.

These

persons would have been recovering from an alcohol and drug
dependency problem together with any other mental health
problems they may have suffered as a result of these addictions.
While Defendants certainly are sympathetic in helping
victims of drug and alcohol abuse the perspective of this type
of treatment center must be kept in mind.
-30-

The state legislature

for example, has mandated that handicapped persons be allowed
to reside in group homes in any residential zone which is
not zoned exclusively for single-family dwellings.
10-9-2,5, U.C.A.

(See Appendix).

Section

The legislature specifically

excluded, however, persons being treated "for alcoholism or
drug abuse" from being placed "in a residential facility for
handicapped persons."

Thus, while peop]|e who have suffered

from mental and physical handicaps such as mental retardation
are given a special status by the state legislature which allows
them to reside in areas regardless of ttie zoning ordinances of
a municipality, such status has not been given the type of
facility proposed in this case.

Thus, the proposed facility

does not have any special status which would entitle it to
consideration beyond a normal applicant for group facilities.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 89 L.Ed.2d
313 (1985) a local ordinance required that a special use permit
be obtained for the establishment of a group home for the insane,
feeble minded, alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional
institutions.

The court concluded that there was no rational

basis for including the "feeble minded" in this classification
since there was no showing that this group of individuals
were of any greater-danger or concern tp the community than
were other groups of individuals which ^fere
in areas without such permit.

allowed to reside

The court, however, did not state

that it was improper for the city to ma ke such classifications
as to other groups including alcoholic pr drug addicts.
Thus far the Utah Legislature has not given any special
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privileges to homes established for the insane, for convicted
felons, or for drug and alcoholic addicts•

The Legislature

has still allowed each community to decide where these group
homes and halfway houses should be placed.

While it is recog-

nized that a stigma will always be present when these facilities
are proposed and that the local residents will undoubtedly be
opposed to the placement of these type of facilities in their
area, the Legislature has placed the discretion in deciding
these questions with the local governing officials.
In summary, therefore, cases which deal with group homes
proposed for mental retardation, for the elderly, for unwanted
children, etc. are not comparable to the facts of this case
and must be carefully examined before any generalities are
made.

It may well be, for example, that in the future the

Legislature will elect to afford drug and alcoholic addicts
who are attempting rehabilitation the same status as a handicapped person has today and may require cities to permit such
homes in all areas without condition.

Until that time comes,

however, the present applicant cannot be afforded any special
advantages or presumptions.
The lower court took the position that the City was
required to prove the negative of any claim.

For example,

a review of the Findings indicates that the Court found that
no "evidence of reduced property values was produced at the
hearings" and that no studies were made and no professional
real estate appraisers presented any negative opinion as to
the property value question.

(Findings Nos. 40 and 41).
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The question then becomes was it the conjmunity1 s obligation
to prove that property values would go down with the establishment of this facility or, to the contrary, was it the obligation of the County to prove that property values would not go
down?

Since a conditional use permit requires a showing on

the part of the applicant as to the cond]itions listed in the
ordinance it is apparent that the burden of persuasion must
be upon the applicant to negate any concerns and is not upon
the City or the residents to prove to the contrary.

The lower

court throughout its findings consistently confuses the burden
of persuasion in this type of hearing.
Another misconception of the lower court is evidenced
by the Memorandum Decision which states}
Perhaps an ultimate question is whether Davis
County Mental Health can pick the site or Clearfield
City can pick the site. The site proposed in the
application is the only one having]an existing
facility. All other proposed sites require a
building project. The answer is obvious. Davis
County Mental Health has the right to pick their
own site. Memorandum Decision at p. 6.
The assumption of the lower court is again that the
plaintiff has a right to establish a grpup home anywhere it
choses in the city unless the City can produce a good reason
for not allowing that site to be chosen
only half correct.

This assumption is

Since the City is vested with discretion

it may decide, for example, not to allow any type of facility
to be established for a specified number of years or in a
specified area of the city.

A city legitimately can decide,

for example, that there is not a sufficient need for the
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establishment of a second hospital in the city limits even
though the hospital would meet all of the necessary requirements.

The same may be said for banks or boarding houses

which are also listed as conditional uses under the PO zone.
The City Council or Planning Commission, in other words, may
decide that the proposed use of the location is not necessary
or desirable in providing "a service or facility which will
contribute to the general well-being of the community."
11-2-4.5, Clearfield City Ordinances.

The City may decide that

it simply does not believe additional hospitals, banks, or
group homes for alcoholics are needed to serve the community
and therefore deny such application on that basis alone.

Of

course, there would have to be a rational basis for this
decision and such denial could not be based merely on the
dislike of the City Council for banking institutions, for
example.
With this standard in mind it is apparent that the
Council and the Zoning Commission acted properly in deciding
that the proposed facility should not be allowed at the
Victor Smith residence.

A number of factors combined to give

the basis for this conclusion.

Individually and collectively

they provide the rational basis required to uphold the decision
of the Council and Commission.
First, there is no question that these type of a?^oholic
and drug abuse centers create a stigma in the area in which
they are being placed.

The same is also true for halfway

houses where prison inmates are allowed to reside.
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Whether

this stigma is justified or not is immaterial since the
residents in that area perceive a danger which affects their
quality of life. Mr. Don Baird who is certainly well qualified
in city planning matters testified as to this phenomonen.

In

the following dialogue with plaintiff's counsel this concern
was expressed by Mr. Baird:
Q.

Isn't it true that the perception of it being
a double in size of mental health, alcohol rehab
center, the perception of thaip is a key factor
in quality of life?

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Perception of a significant stigma that we talked
about that mental health people are somehow different.

A.

No, I wouldn't say the stigmaL I would separate
it from the stigma. I would say that the perception
of that is there because whether or not that facility,
existing or proposed or the two of them contribute to
crime, contribute to the health or physical well-being
or the detriment is completely irrelevant because the
perception of the people who live around there is
real. That's real to them. Whether or not there is
ten crimes or zero crimes, the people who live around
there have a particular perception of what might
happen to them and that perception to them is very
real and that becomes a part of their quality of life.
If a little old lady who lives there says something
like that makes me scared to death, that I have to
lock my doors and windows and I am afraid to go out
at night. Whether it's true or not, it certainly
affects the quality of her lite.

Q.

Isn't that the heart of the problem that we are
facing? That is, that the perception is that those
who will be housed there are [going to hurt us someway;
isn't that true?

A.

I would say that would be part of it.

(Tr. 258-59).

Plaintiff can argue that this perc pption will follow a
proposed facility wherever it is placed

However, while that

may be true the question in this case iIs whether the residents
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who live

in the area of the Victor Smith house should be

subjected to additional perceived danger over and above that
which they saw in the existing ARC facility placed
there since 19 81.

In other words, was it fair to double the

size of the perceived problem population in that area as to
those residents or would it be more equitable to place this
facility in another neighborhood thereby perhaps increasing
fear in that area but reducing it around the present ARC facility.
Such decision is certainly a discretionary call.
The Court of Appeals of Oregon in Anderson v. Peden, 56 9
P.2d 633, 640 (Ore. App. 1977) addressed the problem of allowing
neighborhood input in deciding a conditional use permit.
The Court stated:
Aside from petitioner's choice of pejorative
terms, we see nothing improper with the decision
on a conditional use being based in part on the
feelings of the neighbors who will have to live
with that use, if approved. . . .
In our system
and tradition, political process means democratic
process. Just as it is permissible and proper for
local governments to consider public sentiment in
establishing a legislative land use plan, it is
permissible and proper for local governments to
give such public sentiment such consideration as
may be relevant under the circumstances in considering quasi-judicial changes in that plan.
A second reason causing fears of those in the area
relate to decline of property value.

While the normal question

is whether the placement of an alcohol-drug rehabilitation
center will cause a decline in the values of properties ii. that
area the question in this case was somewhat different.

Since

there was already one facility located in the area the question
became what effect would a second facility have upon the existing
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properties.

Exhibit 18 entitled "The Effect of Group Care

Facilities on Property Values" reports that the Oakland,
California 198 3 study dealing with persdns with mental health,
alcohol and drug problems did cause an impact on property
values.

Shirley Reed, one of the councilwomen with the City

Council stated that the Wolch study of (Oakland, California
also concluded that concentrating these type of facilities in
one area has an even greater impact on property values.
(Tr. 164, 175).
The City Council had a legitimate concern with the question
i

of allowing two quite different facilities together.

The existing

facility known as the Addiction Recovery Center (ARC) involved
adults being treated for chemical addiction.

(Tr. 53). The

new facility was to contain both adults and children experiencing
substance abuse and mental illness.

(Tr. 71).

The District Court of Pennsylvania in Sullivan v. City of
Pittsburgh, 617 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Pa. 1985) found that Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania had wrongfully excluded group homes for
alcoholics throughout the city.

Nevertheless, the court found

that it was a legitimate requirement thpt such facilities could
not be located within one-half mile of Another group residence
or one-quarter mile from an out-patientl drug or alcoholics
clinic.

Id. at 14 98.

The Colorado Court of Appeals in Roundup

Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment! of Denver, 6 26 P.2d
1154 (Colo. App. 1981) upheld a provisi on which prohibited
homes for developmentally disabled pers|ons to be within 20 00
feet of one another.
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Again, Exhibit 18, the study conducted by the APA
Planning Advisory Service also noted that spacing facilities
within a community was a legitimate procedure.

That source

stated:
Regarding the concentration of group care
facilities in a community, residents fear that a
single exception to restrictive regulations
against these facilities, or allowing them as
permitted uses, will attract other facilities to
nearby locations. To avoid this problem, several
communities use distance criteria to control
clustering. . . . Alternative criteria may be the
number of facilities per block, the number of
residents per home, or the number of group care
residents as a percentage of population.
Finally, the Utah Legislature in enacting Section 17-27-11.7
U.C.A. (Residential Facility For Handicapped Persons Permitted
in County Zoning District) and 10-9-2.5 U.C.A.

(Residential

Facility for Handicapped Persons Permitted in Municipal
Zoning Districts) both allow a city to establish a one-mile
distance between existing facilities.
The record is clear that neither the City Council nor
the Planning Commission oppose the establishment of this type
of facility within Clearfield City.

While it is true that

some of the various members and residents felt that Clearfield
City had done its share of social service development there
was no official position ever taken that these type of
facilities would be banned in the future.
The City Council on its own initiative requested Mr. Bair^
to locate sites which would be suitable for this type of
facility but which would not impact on the present area of
the ARC.

The fact that two of these proposed sites have now
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been approved for social service facilities affirms the
intention of the City in supporting these type of programs.
Further, the amendment of the zoning ordinances to allow
these facilities to be placed in any residential district
throughout the city also negates any claim that the City is
opposed to helping those who are addicted to alcoholic and
drug substances.

There is nothing to prevent the County

from finding other existing residences throughout the City
and applying for conditional use permitls.
The clustering of two facilities together was therefore
a justifiable concern on the part of the Council and the
Commission.

While the lower court could conclude that the map

prepared by Mr. Baird in defining neighborhoods was arbitrary
and that the conclusion of 11% of the tptal area in that neighborhood being devoted to social services was incorrect, it
was a proper function of the City to map-ke this determination
of the effected area and certainly the decision of the trial
court as to what area would encompass the surrounding neighborhood would be no less arbitrary.

The important point to

remember, however, is not the arbitrariness of the decision
but the fact that it was supported by a rational basis and was
exercised in the discretion of the Planning Commission staff.
A number of other reasons were stated by various parties
in these proceedings as to why the facility should not be
allowed at the Smith residence.

The proximity to the junior

high, for example, was a legitimate concern in view of the
young ages of the proposed residents ofl the facility and in
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view of the drug trafficking which was occurring at the junior
high.

The Council certainly had the discretion regardless of

the views of Dr. Williams to conclude that it was not in the
general welfare of those students and patients to have the
facility in such a close proximity. Other factors such as the
cost of construction, the loss of tax base, and the crime rate
were still legitimate concerns but apparently did not play a
major part in the decision.
The lower court seemed concerned that there were no
written findings made by either the Planning Commision or
the City Council.

Neither state law nor city ordinances

required such findings.

The minutes of the various meetings

constitute the record in these type of cases and are normally
adequate to provide a basis for the decision.

The Washington

Appellate Court in noting a similar complaint about findings
stated:
There is no requirement in the zoning code that
the city council must, on appeal, enter written findings
of fact. We think the contention of appellants was
effectively answered and disposed of in [a prior case]
which said "There is no requirement in the zoning code
of a written document, and the word 'findings' means
nothing more than administrative determinations."
This principle is, in our opinion, fully applicable
here. When the council acted to grant Safewayfs application, it determined that the "facts" necessary to the
grant were present. The record itself is available to
review whether or not such determination had a factual
basis. Findings of fact on permits, licenses, and so
forth would constitute an onerous burden upon already
overburdened city councils. Morrison v. Seattle, 492
P.2d 1078, 1085 (Wash. App. 1971).
In conclusion, the lower court erred in finding that the
decision of the City Council and the Zoning Commission was
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arbitrary, capricious and without rational basis.

While it

certainly can be said that the arguments presented by the
County in favor of the establishment of such a facility at
the Smith residence are logical and sound it can also be said
that the concerns voiced by various members of the public and
by the members of the staff and governing bodies are also
legitimate.

Mr. Baird and Mr. Summerkojrn, both highly trained

planning professionals, correctly identified the options
available in this case when they informed the Commission and
Council that they were justified in deciding either way.
(Tr. 128, 223). As one court noted:
Where there is room for two opinions, action
is not arbitrary or capricious whep. exercised
honestly and upon due consideratioh, even though
it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion
has been reached. Lillions v. Gibbs, 289 P.2d 203,
205 (Wash. App. 1955).
For these reasons, therefore, the decision of the City
Council and Planning Commission must be| reinstated and the
decision of the lower court reversed.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING COMMISSION
AND CLEARFIELD CITY COUNCIL UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
APPLIED SECTION 11 OF CHAPTER 12 OF THE CLEARFIELD
ZONING ORDINANCES IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7 AND
SECTION 24 OF ARTICLE I OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND SECTION I OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
It is somewhat difficult to understand why the lower court
entered its Conclusions of Law Nos. 3 dnd 7.

In both instances

the court stated that there was not a rational or reasonable
basis for the denial of the applicatiorj for conditional use
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permit by the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the
Clearfield City Council and that both had unconstitutionally
applied Section 11 of Chapter 12 of the Clearfield Zoning
Ordinances in violation of Sections 7 and 24 of Article I of
the Utah Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

The memorandum decision written

by the court in minute detail did not refer to these alleged
constitutional violations.

The court specifically found the

Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance constitutional.

(See page 1

Memorandum Decision).
Assuming that the lower court intended to make a constitutional determination, the decision is still erroneous.

First,

the statutory zoning scheme in place during the time of this
permit request as well as the present scheme of Clearfield
City is not unconstitutional on its face.

The conditional use

requirement imposed upon plaintiff for their alcohol and drug
rehabilitation

facility is no different than the conditions

imposed upon any conditional use in the city.

Thus, this

statute is unlike the Texas statute in the Cleburne Living
Center case, supra, which specifically referred to the feeble
minded, alcoholics, institutional prisoners, and the insane
in requiring certain types of special zoning requirements. It
is equally unlike the statute of Washington which set up a
complete procedure for the establishment of group homes
housing former mental patients.

J.W. v. City of Tacoma,

Washington, 720 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 1983). Even so,
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
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held that a city could provide for special requirements of
selected groups of individuals as

long as there was a rational

basis for such selection and that therefore equal protection
was not violated by the ordinance itself.
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in both cases, however, found tnat these valid statutes
have been unconstitutionally applied.

Both courts concluded

that there was no rational reason given by the governing
authority for the denial of the various permits and that
they had utilized these special statutes to deny mentally
retarded patients and former mental patfents the right to
be housed in group homes.
Again, this situation does not apply to the instant
case.

In the first place the Utah Legislature has not given

alcohol and drug dependent patients any special privileges
over other classes of persons as it has| done with the mentally
and physically handicapped.

No controlling Utah court has

ever given these individuals special status requiring close
scrutiny of regulations against them.

The patients in these

facilities are therefore not deemed to be a suspect classification as is the case with ethnic, racial, gender, and other
types of classification.
Second, the City has certainly not!expressed any policy
against helping this class of individuals as is evidenced by
the establishment of the existing ARC facility.

This is

therefore unlike other cases in which cities have refused to
grant any homes for certain classifications of persons or have
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declared moritoriums as to future group homes of protected
classifications of individuals.
Had a bank been denied a conditional use permit to
establish a branch next to an existing bank no claim of
constitutional due process could be made.
case do not produce a different result.

The facts of this

Merely because

these particular individuals are undergoing drug and alcohol
therapy does not give them a right to claim constitutional
protection because of the denial of this type of facility.
If this were the case than all mental health, drug, alcohol,
and juvenile facilities could essentially write their own
ticket as to any location that was desired within a municipality
on the basis that to deny such usage would amount to a constitutional deprivation.
It would serve no purpose to review the rational basis
utilized by the City governing bodies in denying this permit
since the extensive discussion in the preceding section has
adequately covered these contentions.

The hours of testimony

at public hearings together with the additional hours of numerous
staff members of the City in investigating and reporting the
pros and cons of locating this facility in the Smith home belie
any claims of a due process violation.

The City was completely

justified in deciding that the impact of a second facility in
this particular neighborhood was too great and that if a
facility was to be established it would have to be at another
location.

The record in this case quite clearly shows that

the decision was not based upon raw emotion but was based upon
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a logical and rational consideration of all of the circumstances .
Finally, the amendment of the present ordinances to
allow these types of facilities throughout the city again
refutes any claim of constitutional impropriety.

The City

and the citizens of Clearfield are clearly dedicated to
helping these types of individuals to recover and to become
useful citizens of the community.

It is, however, the right

of their elected officials to decide where such facilities
will be located and under what conditions they will be
established.

It is not the role of the judiciary to second

guess this process.
CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons the loweib court erred in
determining that the decision of the Clearfield City Planning
Commission and the Clearfield City Council was not based upon
facts and was arbitrary and capricious

Likewise, there is

no evidence to substantiate a conclusion that a constitutional
violation occurred by this action.
The decision of the lower court shcbuld be reversed and
the decision of the Council and Commission reinstated,
Respectfully submitted,
/.

/

M.

,V/"\ /

\ W- /

Craig S. ,Co<pk
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
JUDGMENT
CLEARFIELD CITY ZONING ORDINANCES
SECTION FROM UTAH STATE CODE

In the District Court of the Second Jujiicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of U^ah

DAVIS COUNTY,
Plaintiff,.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No. 36431

vs.
CLEARFIELD CITY,
Defendant.

This case came before the Court for trial on April 24, 1986,
with Gerald E. Hess appearing for the plaintiff, Davis County,
Steven R. Bailey appearing for the plaintiff, Victor Smith, and
Melvin C. Wilson appearing for the defendants, Clearfield City
and Clearfield City Planning Commission.
evidence and argument, the court took the ^ase under advisement
The court now rules on the case.
The court finds the actions of the Clearfield City Council
and the Clearfield City Planning Commission in denying a
conditional use permit to Davis County for
mental health
transitional facility to be arbitrary and capricious and without
substantial basis in fact. Also, there was no rational basis for
the denial.
Clearfield City is ordered to approve the
conditional use permit. The court does not, however, find the
Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance unconstitutional,
The court
orders each party to pay their own costs.
Davis County, through its Department jof Mental Health made
an application to Clearfield City on j{ine 25, 1984, for
conditional use permit for a mental health transitional facility
at 904 South State in Clearfield City. Clearfield City personnel
aided Davis County in the preparation of a proper application.
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The Clearfield City Planning Commission held a public hearing on
July 18, 1984. The hearing lasted about two and one-half hours.
The Planning Commission denied the application. No findings of
fact or conclusions of law were made. Several persons present at
the meeting expressed their opinions as to the basis for ruling.
None are acceptable or authorized by the Planning Commission,
however. Davis County wrote a letter on July 30, 1984, asking
Clearfield City for formal findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and decision so that it could intelligently respond to these
matters on the appeal to the City Council.
Clearfield City
failed to furnish any. This court must, therefore, conclude that
there was not a rational basis for such decision by the Planning
Commission.
The Clearfield City Council held public hearings on
September 11, 1984, and October 9, 1984.
The September 11
meeting was a lengthy public meeting. All sides were given ample
opportunity to present their views. The hearing was continued to
October 9 so that research could be done on the application and
so that a legal opinion could be obtained.
The October 9 public meeting began at 7:15 P. M. It was a
relatively short meeting.
Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a
motion almost at the beginning of the meeting to uphold the
decision of the Planning Commission. The City Council had met in
ostensibly a public meeting at 6:00 P. M. of the same evening
without any outsiders being present and discussed the merits of
the plaintiffs1 application. It in fact was not an open meeting.
No minutes were taken of the meeting.
The Council members
obviously relied on information supplied in that meeting,
however. This was evident from the statements made by them in
the later meeting.
No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or formal opinion
came out of either the September 11 or October 9 meeting.
Fortunately, the Davis County Mental Health tape recorded and
transcribed both meetings verbatim.
The court has read the

-3-

transcripts carefully.
No where in the transcripts do I find
believable information or evidence on which the Clearfield City
Council could have rationally believed that the proposed mental
health facility would pose any special| threat to Clearfield
City's legitimate interests.
There is no zone in Clearfield wherein the proposed facility
could be located as a matter of right. Davis County had to rely
on a conditional uste permit. Clearfield City's zoning ordinance
changed just prior to the October 9, 1984, decision. Previous to
the change 904 South State was locatled in a PO zone or
professional office zone.
This area had been changed from a
residential zone to PO zone in about 1979. After the September
1984 zone change it was known as a C-l zonje.
The evidence at the public hearings shows that residential
zones are the
preferable zones for the type of facility
proposed by plaintiffs.
There is, howejver, a stigma that is
still attached to mental health facilities.
It is generally
believed that somehow the location of
residential zone will endanger the residents of the area and
lower property values.
Believable studies show that neither of
these propositions is true. Nevertheless, both Clearfield City
and other cities in Davis County have been very reluctant to
approve such facilities in residential zones. In an effort to
accommodate such feelings, the Davis County Mental Health has
made application for such facilities in zones that are not
strictly residential. Such is the case here. The PO zone or C-l
zone would appear to be an acceptable alternative to the more
desirable residential zones.
The evidence at the public hearings show that the decision
to deny was made because of public clampr.
Indeed, there is
almost uniform public clamor when any mental health facility,
halfway house, jail or prison is proposedj. The public realizes
the need for such facilities, but they should always be located
somewhere else. The plaintiffs need in this case was to locate
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in the North end of Davis County. This was to serve the needs of
the citizens living in the North end of the County, although
there would be persons from all parts of the County housed in the
facility
from time to time.
Citizen opposition is a
consideration which must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis
for the decision to deny.
Two professional planners were involved in this case.
Neither Wilford Summercorn, the Clearfield City Planner nor Wally
Baird, the Clearfield City Manager could find any professional
objection to the granting of the application.
Some suggestion was made during the trial that Clearfield
City was not doing its share to approve public service facilities
within the City limits. Such a suggestion is absurd. Clearfield
City has a great deal of public spirit and public responsibility.
They are responsive to the needs of society. While occasionally
disputes such as this arise, it does not take away from their
willingness to promote the public good.
Two areas of concern were put forth at the public hearings
that deserve consideration. First was the idea that the proposed
facility would create a danger or a nuisance because of its
proximity to a junior high school, an alcohol rehabilitation
center, and residents. Neither the Davis County School District
nor the junior high administrators opposed the proposed facility.
This was so even though it was public knowledge that the facility
would house minors with drug problems and other mental health
problems.
The police department made a presentation at the
hearings, but did not show that crime would increase in the area.
There was some vague concern for possible future problems, but
nothing concrete.
The existence of the ARC just north of 904
South State since 1981 had not created criminal problems in the
area.
No evidence showed any likelihood of increased social
problems because this facility and the ARC would be adjacent to
one another.
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The second area of concern involved real estate values.
Property owners expressed opinions that property values would go
No professional real
down.
No studies were made however,
estate appraisers gave their opinions, ex Icept for* the plaintiff,
Victor Smith. His interest in the mattejr taints his testimony,
but does not mean it should be disregarded. It was his opinion
that the ARC had not impacted property yalues in the area and
that the proposed facility would not. Sope possible uses of the
new C-l zone, such as a restaurant <br garage or multiple
apartment dwelling might lower property values, but not the
proposed facility.
No credible evidence of reduced property
values was produced at the hearings.
An argument was made that 11% of the land in a designated
area would be devoted to public service jases if the application
were granted.
This 11% figure has n0 validity.
The area
included and excluded from the designated area was arbitrarily
drawn. It did not include a separate neighborhood or the PO zone
or any other area distinguishable on a reasonable basis
Also,
the map used for the area, along with the conclusions to be drawn
from the map were discussed at the preplarjning meeting on October
9, 1984, and not at the public hearing. Tjhe map was not used at
the public meeting or explained to those present at the public
meeting.
An argument was made that Clearfield City did not want the
proposed facility and the ARC adjacent to each other.
No
evidence was produced to show that any harm would come from the
arrangement, except that the property would be taken off the tax
producing rolls of Clearfield City. This ^as insufficient reason
to justify a denial.
An argument was made that there were four structured
residential type facilities located withifi a radius of one mile
of the proposed facility. The facts may be true but Clearfield
City is only about 2.5 miles in diameter. After the application
was denied, Clearfield City suggested five possible alternate
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sites to Davis County. There was no guarantee that any of the
five sites would be approved. Three of the five were near the
hospital which is within Layton City limits.
In that general
vicinity there are seven or eight facilities including the
hospital, two clinics, two doctors office buildings, a physical
rehabilitation home, and an alcohol rehabilitation center. It
appears that Clearfield City prefers to cluster these facilities
into one area.
There is nothing wrong with the clustering
method, but in this case it does not meet the criteria for a
residential transitional mental health facility, because of the
lack of residential surroundings, bus transportation, schools,
and churches.
Perhaps an ultimate question is whether Davis County Mental
Health can pick the site or Clearfield City can pick the site.
The site proposed in the application is the only one having an
existing facility. All other proposed sites require a building
project. The answer is obvious. Davis County Mental Health has
the right to pick their own site.
If Clearfield City has a
rational basis for denying the application, then its decision
will be upheld.
If reasons are given, but the reasons are
specious or fail the reasonable person test, then the reasons
will be disregarded. There must be substance to the reasons.
A decision is said to be arbitrary when it is arrived at
through will or caprice.
A decision is capricious when it
proceeds from whim or fancy. A decision is without basis in fact
when it cannot be supported with rational facts and arguments.
The decision of the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the
Clearfield City Council was well intentioned, but falls into the
above categories.
The
plaintiff, Davis County, is ordered to draw a formal
opinion in conformity •'-o this decision.
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Dated May 7, 1986.
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Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to Gerald E.
Hess, Davis County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah; Melvin C.
Wilson, 133 South State, Suite 203, Clearfield, Utah 84015 and
Steven R. Bailey, 2564 Washington Blvd.), Suite 2, Ogden, Utah
84401 on May 8, 1986.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT,^
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic
of the State of Utah, and
VICTOR SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT

vs.

AND

CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah and the
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING
COMMISSION,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 36431

Defendants.

The above matter, having come on regularly for trial on
April 24, 1986, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one of
the judges of the above-entitled court; Plaintiff Davis County
being represented by Gerald E. Hess, Deputy Davis County
Attorney, and Plaintiff Victor Smith being represented by Steven
R. Bailey, and Defendants being represented by Melvin C. Wilson;
and witnesses having been called and testimony having been taken
and exhibits having been introduced, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Davis County, through its Department of Mental

Health, made an application to Clearfield City on June 25, 1984

V=\\Jj\eO

for a Conditional Use Permit for a Mental Health Transitional
I
Facility to be located at 904 South State in Clearfield, Utah.
2.

Davis County had obtained an earnest money

agreement with Victor Smith for the purchase of the property
located at 904 South State Street in Clearfield, Utah, subject to
approval of the Conditional Use Permit by Clearfield City.
3.

Clearfield City personnel aided Davis County in the

preparation of the application for a Conditional Use Permit.
4.

Pursuant to notice, the Clearfield City Planning

Commission held a public hearing on July 18, 1984, to consider
the application of Davis County, which hearjing lasted
approximately 2 1/2 hours.
5.

No accurate written record of the Planning

Commission Hearing was preserved, and no findings of fact or
conclusions of law were made.
6.

The Planning Commission voted to deny the

Conditional Use Permit Application of Davis County.
7.

Several persons present at thte meeting expressed

their opinions as to the basis for the Planning Commission
ruling, but no official or authorized reason for the ruling was
ever stated by the Planning Commission.
8.

Clearfield City failed to furbish to Davis County

any findings of fact, conclusions of law, of decision from the
Clearfield City Planning Commission even though Davis County made
written request for them.
9.

On July 26, 1984, Davis County filed with

Clearfield City a formal appeal of the denial of the Conditional
2

Use Permit by the Clearfield City Planning Commission, which
appeal was made to the Clearfield City Council in accordance with
the Clearfield City Ordinances.
10.

The Clearfield City Council held public hearings on

September 11, 1984, and thereafter on October 9, 1984, to
consider the appeal of Davis County.
11. The September 11, 1984, meeting was a lengthy public
meeting where all sides were given ample opportunity to present
their views.
12.

The hearing of September 11, 1984, was continued to

October 9, 1984, at 7:15 p.m., so that research could be done on
the application, and so that a legal opinion could be obtained.
13.

The October 9, 1984, continuation of the public

hearing began at 7:15 p.m., and was a relatively short meeting.
14. Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a motion almost at
the beginning of the October 9, 1984, meeting to uphold the
decision of the Planning Commission.
15.

The City Council had met in ostensibly a public

meeting at 6:00 p.m. on October 9, 1986, without any outsiders
being present or invited, and discussed the merits of the
Application of Davis County.
16.

No minutes were taken of the portion of the City

Council meeting which began at 6:00 p.m. on October 9, 1984.
17.

The City Council members relied on information

supplied to them at the meeting which began at 6:00 p.m., and the
information supplied to the City Council at the meeting which
3

began at 6:00 p.m. was not presented when tlhe public hearing
commenced at 7:15 p.m. on October 9, 1984.
18.

No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or formal

opinion came out of either the September 11,, 1984, meeting or the
October 9, 1984, meeting.
19.

Although Clearfield City did not tape record or

transcribe the proceedings of the public hearing, Davis County
Mental Health recorded and transcribed both meetings verbatim,
and nowhere in the transcripts is there bel:ievable information or
evidence on which the Clearfield City Council could have
rationally believed that the proposed Mental Health facility
would pose any special threat to Clearfield} City's legitimate
interest.
20.

There is no zone in Clearfielld City wherein the

proposed facility could be located as a matter of right, and
therefore, Plaintiff Davis County had to rely on a Conditional Use
Permit in order to place a Mental Health facility in Clearfield
City.
21.

Clearfield City's Zoning Ordijnance changed just

prior to the October 9, 1984, public hearing.

Previous to the

change, 904 South State was located in a PO zone, or Professional
Office zone.
22.

The area located at approximately 904 South State

Street, Clearfield, Utah, had been a residential zone prior to
1979, but was changed to a PO zone in approximately 1979.
23.

After the September 1984 zone change, the subject

property was included in a C-l zone.
4

23.

At the public hearings, evidence was presented to

the effect that residential zones are the preferable zones for
the type of facility proposed by Plaintiffs Davis County.
24.

Evidence presented at the public hearings

demonstrates there is a stigma attached to Mental Health
facilities, so that many who live in residential zones believe
they will be endangered by persons who will be housed in the
Mental Health facility, and also that the property values in the
vicinity will be lowered.
25.

Presented at the public hearings were believable

studies which show that residents of the Mental Health facility
proposed will not endanger residents of the surrounding area, nor
will the placement of a Mental Health facility lower property
values in the area.
26.

Both Clearfield City and other cities in Davis

County have been reluctant to approve Mental Health facilities in
residential zones.

In an effort to accommodate such feelings, the

Davis County Mental Health has made application for such
facilities in zones that are not strictly residential, such as
the Professional Office zone in which the proposed facility is
located.
27.

Placement of the Mental Health facility in the PO

zone or C-l zone would appear to be an acceptable alternative to
the more desirable residential zones.
28.

There was evidence presented at the public hearing

that residents believed a Mental Health facility was a good idea,
but not located near them.
5

29.

The evidence at the public hearings show that the

decision to deny was made because of public clamor.
30.

The Plaintiff's need as presented in the public

hearing was to locate in the north end of Davis County, so as to
serve the needs of the citizens living in tpe north end of Davis
County.

Although residents of Clearfield C^ty would be assisted

at the Mental Health Center, persons from atl parts of the county
would be housed in the facility from time tp time.
31.

Two professional planners involved in the public

hearings could find no significant professional objection to the
granting of the application.
33.

Some suggestion was made during the trial that

Clearfield City was not doing its share to Approve public service
facilities within the city limits; but the Evidence shows
Clearfield City has a great deal of public ^pirit and public
responsibility, and are responsive to the needs of society,
although occasionally disputes do arise, but it is clear that
Clearfield City desires to promote the public good.
34.

Some members of the Clearfield City Planning

Commission and the Clearfield City Council expressed concern that
placement of the Mental Health facility woup.d create a danger or
nuisance because of its proximity to a junibr high school, an
Alcohol Rehabilitation Center, and to residents.
35.

Neither the Davis County School District nor any

representative from the adjacent junior high appeared at the
public hearings to oppose the proposed facility.

36.

Dr. Russell Williams, Director of Davis County

Mental Health, testified at the public hearings that placement of
the Mental Health facility at the proposed location would not
create any significant problems for residents of the facility,
nor would residents of the facility create any danger or nuisance
to students at the junior high school, Alcohol Rehabilitation
residents, or local residents.
37.

The Clearfield City Police Department made a

presentation at the hearings, but did not show that crime would
increase in the area, although there was some vague concern
expressed for possible future problems, but nothing concrete.
38.

The-existence of the ARC just north of 904 South

State Street since 1981 had not created criminal problems in the
area.
39.

No evidence presented to the Planning Commission

showed any likelihood of increased social problems because this
facility and the ARC would be adjacent to one another.
40.

No studies were made and no professional real

estate appraisers presented any negative opinion to the hearings
before the Planning Commission and the City Council, except for
Plaintiff Victor Smith.

His interest in the matter taints his

testimony, but does not mean it should be disregarded.

It was

his opinion that the ARC had not impacted property values in the
area, and that the proposed facility would not.

Some possible

uses of the new C-l zone such as a restaurant or garage or
multiple apartment dwelling might lower property values, but not
the proposed facility.
7

41.

No evidence of reduced property values was produced

at the hearings, except from persons who owned property in the
area, and their concerns were based upon fear of what might
happen, rather than upon any objective study.
42.

In the motion made by a Clearfield City

Councilperson to deny the Conditional Use Permit, reference was
made to the fact that eleven percent of land in a designated area
would be devoted to public service uses if|the application were
granted.

This eleven percent figure has no validity.

The area

included and excluded from the designated area was arbitrarily
drawn.

It did not include a separate neighborhood or the PO zone

or any other area distinguishable on a reasonable basis. Also,
the map used for the area, along with the conclusions to be drawn
from the map were discussed at the preplanning meeting on October
9, 1984, and not at the public hearing.

Tike map was not used at

the public meeting or explained to those present at the public
meeting.
43.

No evidence was produced at the public hearing to

show that any harm would come from the proposed facility being
located adjacent to the present ARC, except that the property
would be taken off the tax producing rolls of Clearfield City.
44.

Members of the Clearfield City Council indicated

one reason for denial of the proposed facility was that there
were four structured residential type facilities located within a
radius of one mile of the proposed facility.
45.

Clearfield City is only about 2.5 miles in

diameter.
8

46,

After the Clearfield City Council denied the

application, the city suggested five possible alternate sites to
Davis County, but there was no guarantee that any of the five
sites would be approved as a Conditional Use, either by the
Clearfield City Planning Commission, or the Clearfield City
Council.

Three of the five sites were near the hospital which is

within Layton City,
47.

Clearfield City requested and received from Davis

County a great deal of information related to the economic
feasibility of acquiring the Vic Smith property and transforming
it into a Mental Health facility.
48-

Any of the sites recommended by Clearfield City

were vacant properties and buildings would have been required to
be constructed on the various sites.
49.

One Clearfield City Councilman who visited the ARC

facility expressed fear and apprehension as he entered the
facility, but after he had learned about the kind of people
receiving treatment in the facility and the various treatment
programs, his fear of the facility vanished.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCISIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff has no plain and adequate remedy at law.

2.

Plaintiff Davis County has exhausted its

administrative remedies.
3.

There was not a rational or reasonable basis for

denial of the Application for Conditional Use Permit by the
9

Clearfield City Planning Commission, in that the Clearfield City
Planning Commission unconstitionally applied Section 11 of
Chapter 12 of the Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of
Section 7 and Section 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution
and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
4.

The City Council meeting which commenced on October

9, 1984, at 6:00 p.m. was not an open meeting, as required by the
statutes of the State of Utah.
5.

Citizen opposition to the proposed Mental Health

facility must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis for the
decision to deny the Conditional Use Permit.
6.

The actions of the Clearfield City Planning

Commission and the Clearfield City Council in denying a
Conditional Use"Permit to Plaintiff Davis County for a Mental
Health Transitional Facility was arbitrary|and capricious and
discriminatory and without substantial basis in fact.
7.

There was no rational or reasonable basis for

defendant Clearfield City Council to deny the Conditional Use
Permit to Davis County, in that the Clearfield City Council
unconstitutionally applied Section 11 of Chapter 12 of the
Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of Section 7 and Section
24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution and of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
8.

The Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance, in effect on

June 25, 1984, and as thereafter amended, is not
unconstitutional.
10

9.

A Writ of Mandamus should be issued ordering and

requiring the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the
Clearfield City Council to approve the Conditional Use Permit
Application of Plaintiff Davis County, and issue a Conditional
Use Permit to Davis County, thereby authorizing Davis County to
operate a Mental Health Transitional Treatment facility at 904
South State Street, Clearfield, Utah.
10.

Each party should be required to bear its own costs

and attorney's fees.
DATED this

,^$

day of May, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to:
Melvin C. Wilson
Attorney at Law
133 South State Street, Suite 203
Clearfield, Utah 84015
and ~
Steven R. Bailey
Attorney at Law
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2
Ogden, Utah 84401
w4th -pootage- prepaid thereon, this
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LOREN D. MARTIN
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse Building
Farmington, Utah 84025
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic
of the State of Utah, and
VICTOR SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT AND

vs,

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah and the
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING
COMMISSION,

CiJil No. 36431

Defendants.

The above matter, having come on regularly for trial on
April 24, 1986, before the Honorable Dougi as L. Cornaby, one of
the judges of*the above-entitled court; PIaintiff Davis County
being represented by Gerald E. Hess, Deputy Davis County
Attorney, and Plaintiff Victor Smith beind represented by Steven
R. Bailey, and Defendants being represented by Melvin C. Wilson;
and witnesses having been called and testimony having been taken
and exhibits having been introduced, and tpe Court having made
and entered its Findings of Fact and conclusions of law;
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and
decreed as follows:

1.

The Clearfield City Planning Commission and the

Clearfield City Council are hereby ordered to approve the
Conditional Use Permit Application of Plaintiff Davis County, and
to issue a Conditional Use Permit to Plaintiff Davis County,
thereby allowing and authorizing Davis County to operate a Mental
Health Transitional Treatment Facility at the address commonly
known as 904 South State Street, Clearfield, Utah.
2.

The Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance in effect on

June 25, 1984, and subsequently amended is constitutional, and
the request of Plaintiff Davis County to declare the ordinance
unconstitutional is hereby denied with prejudice.
3.

Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's

fees.
DATED this ^ /

day of May, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

M I C H A E L OyALLP!-:.r:, C L Z R K

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I sailed a t}rue and correct copy
of the foregoing Judgment and Writ of Mandamus to:
Melvin C. Wilson
Attorney at Law
133 South State Street/ Suite 203
Clearfield, Utah 84015
and
Steven R. Bailey
Attorney at Law
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2
Ogden, Utah 84401
with poGtago prepaid thereon, this /f)

ddy of May, 1986.

:JELVIN C. WILSON
Attorney at Law
133 South State, Suite 203
Clearfield, Utah 34015
Telephone: 773-1440

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUFT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic of the
State of Utah, and VICTOR SMITH,
Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of Utah
and the
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING COMMISSION,

Civil No. 1-3643J

Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that Defendant-Affellants, CLEARFIELD CITY, a
Municipal Corporation of the State of Utah, and CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING
CQt-IMISSICN, by and thru their attorney, MELVIN C. WILSON, hereby appeal frcn
the judgment entered by the Court en May 28, 1986, in the above-entitled

razt

to the Utah Supreme Court.
DATED this

g*3r-

day of June, 1986.

MELVIN i . WILSON
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants
CERTIFICATION OF MAILTSG
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the forecoing
Jtotice of Appeal to GERALD C. HESS, Chief Civil Deputy, Davis County Attorney's
Office, Courthouse, Famington, Utah 34025, and STEVEN R. BAILEY, Attorney at
Law, 2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2, Ogden, Utah 34401, postace prepaid this

C!l * •"=D

-2^3

~

day of June, 1986.

v U,\ Q-(oUt

i^''-<-i-/-xm.M.-S-T\

Brooke Robinson
Legal Secretary to MELVIN C

WILSON

Chapter 12
P-0 PROFESSIONAL OFFICE ZONE
Sections:
11-12-1
11-12-2
11-12-3
11-12-4
11-12-5
11-12-6
11-12-7
11-12-3
11-12-9
11-12-10
11-12-11
11-12-12
11-12-13
11-12-14
11-12-15

Purpose and Objectives
Permitted Uses
Lot Area
Lot Width
Lot Frontage
Prior Created Lots
Lot Area Per Dwelling
Yard Requirements
Projections into Yard
Building Height
Distance Between Buildings
Permissible Lot Coverage
Parking, Loading and Access
Site Plan Approval
Other Requirements

11-12-1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES. The Professional Office
(P-O) Zone is established to provide areas in close proximity to
the Central Business District, hospitals, business areas, and
along arterials or major collector streets which will accommodate
mixed multi-family residential uses and offices or laboratories
for professional persons and related uses. This zone should not
be established in a "strip" zoning manner along major streets, but
should be concentrated to provide easy accessibility to the public.
The zone is intended to provide availability of professional services
conveniently to all neighborhoods in the community.
Uses permitted in the P-0 Zone would typically include medium
density apartments, offices for doctors, dentists, accountants,
and other similar professions, medical, and dental laboratories,
and pharmacies.
11-12-2 PERMITTED USES. Those uses or categories of uses
as listed herein, and no others, are permitted in the P-0 Zone.
All uses listed herein are listed by number as designated in
the Standard Land Use Code published and maintained by the Building
and Zoning Department. Specific uses are identified by a fourdigit number in which all digits are whole numbers. Classes or
groupings of such uses permitted in the zone are identified b^ a
four-digit number in which the last one or two digits are zeros.
All such categories listed herein, and all specific uses contained
within them in the Standard Land Use Code, will be permitted in the
P-0 Zone subject to the limitations set forth herein.
PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

A. Permitted Principal Uses, The following principal
uses and structures, and no others, are permitted in the
P-0 Zone:
USE NO,

USE CLASSFICIATIONS

1141

Apartment (Low-rise, detached) (constructed
to the standards of RJ-3 Zone provisions)

4800

Utilities (Lines and rights-of-way only)
(Except 4850)

6311

Advertising Servicesi (Office only)

6320

Consumer Credit Services

6330

Duplicating, Stenographic and Office Services

6340

Dwelling, Janitorial and Other Building
Services (Office only)

6350

News Syndicate Servi ces (Office Only)

6360

Employment Services

6390

Miscellaneous Businel ss Services (Office only)

6500

Professional Service s (Office only - no
lodging or bed facilities)

6710

Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Offices

6900

Miscelleneous Service Organizations
only)

5912

Prescription Pharma :y (Intended for the
convenience of permitted establishments
and/or clients thereof, provided that no
such business occup ies more than 15 percent
of the total floor area of the building
in which it is locajted and has no separate
street entrance.)

(Office

B.
Permitted Accessory Uses, Accessory uses and structures
are permitted in the P-0 Zone, provideq they are incidental
to, and do not substantially alter the character of the
permitted principal use or structure. Such permitted accessory
uses and structures include, but are nc^t limited to, the
following:
1.

Accessory buildings such as garages, carports,

greenhouses, bath houses, gardening shed, recreation
rooms, and similar structures which are customarily
used in conjection with and are incidental to
principal uses and structures allowed in the P-0 Zone,
2. Swimming pools and incidental bath houses.
3. Storage of materials used for the construction of a
building including a temporary contractor's office
and/or tool shed, provided that such uses are on the
building site or immediately adjacent thereto, and
provided that such use shall be for only the period of
construction and thirty (30) days thereafter.
4. Household pets in residential dwelling units/ provided
there shall be no more than one (1) pet over the age
of four (4) months per dwelling unit. Nothing herein
shall be construed as authorizing the keeping of any
animals capable of inflicting harm or discomfort or
endangering the health and safety of any person or
property.
C. Conditional Uses. The following uses and structures are
permitted in the P-0 Zone only after a Conditional Use Permit
has been approved by the Planning Commission, and subject to
the terms and conditions thereof.
USE NO.

USE CLASSIFICATION

1210

Rooming and Boarding Houses

1211

Baching Apartments (in structures devotee
exclusively to that use) (Six (6) tenants
per unit maximum to standards of R-4 Zom

4700

Communications

4800

Utilities

6111

Banking and Related Functions

6513

Hospitals

6516

Sanitariums, ^Convalescent, and Rest Home
Services ~"
* ~ * w^^pL^~

'

(except lines and rights-of-wa^

11-12-3 LOT AREA. The minimum lot area of any lot or parce
land in the P-0 Zone shall be seven thousand (7,000) square fe
11-12-4 LOT WIDTH. Each lot or parcel of land in the P-0
e shall have a width of not less than seventy (70) feet.
11-12-5 LOT FRONTAGE. Each lot or parcel of land in the
Zone shall abut a public street for a minimum distance of
ty (50) feet, on a line parallel to the center line of a stree

Chapter 2
ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURES
Sections:
11-2-1
11-2-2
11-2-3
11-2-4
11-2-5
11-2-6

Hearings - Notice and Procedure
Amendment - Procedure
Variances - Procedure
Conditional Use Permit - Procedure
Appeals
Annexed Territory - Zoning

11-2-1 HEARINGS - NOTICE AND PROCEDURE. Notices of Public
Hearings required by this Title before the B^ard of Adjustment,
the Planning Commission, or the City Council shall be given at
least fifteen (15) calendar days before the Hearing in a manner
hereinafter set forth. Such notice shall s t|ate the time and place
of such hearings and shall include a general! explanation of the
matter to be considered and a general descri)ption of the area
affected.
A. If the matter is before the Boarc} of Adjustment, the
Planning Commission, or the City Courjcil, the notice shall
be published at least once in a news] aper of general circulation within Clearfield City.
B. If the matter is before the Board of Adjustment or the
Planning Commission, The City shall, in addition to the above
notice by publication, mail or otherwise deliver a notice to
each owner of property within a radius of three hundred (300)
feet of the exterior boundaries of the subject property, including any property owner(s) outsidi the corporate limits of
Clearfield City. Such notice shall be headed "NOTICE OF
PUBLIC HEARING," and shall briefly describe the property
involved and the changes, permits, or variances requested.
It shall also state the place, date and time of the hearing.
The list of property owners within three hundred (300) feet
shall be taken from the latest asses p e n t rolls prepared by
the County Assessor of Davis County.
11-2-2 AMENDMENT
PROCEDURE. This Zoning Title, including
ne map, may be amended by the City Council after said amendments
shall have first been submitted for recommendation to the Planning
Commission. The recommendation of the Planjning Commission shall be
submitted I D the City Council within thirty (30) days after the
presentation of the rezoning proposal or pe tition for amendment at a
regularLy scheduled Planning Commission Me ating.
For the purpose of establishing and maintaining sound, stable,
and desirable development within the City, it is declared to be the
public policy that amendments shall not be made to the Zoning Title,

and Map, except to promote more fully the objectives and purposes
of this Title or to correct manifest errors. Any person seeking
an amendment to the Planning and Zoning Title or Map shall submit
to the Building and Zoning Department a written petition containing
the following information:
A. Designation of the specific zone change or Title
amendment desired.
B. The reason and justification for such zone change or Title
amendment, and a statement setting forth the manner in which
a proposed amendment or Zone would further promote the
objectives and purposes of the Zoning Title.
C. A complete and accurate legal description of the area
proposed to be rezoned, or a draft of the proposed Title
amendment.
D. An accurate plat, drawn to scale, showing all areas to be
included within the proposed rezoning, designating the present
zoning of the property subject of the petition, and properties
immediately adjacent thereto.
E. A list of all property owners within a radius of three
hundred (300) feet of the boundaries of the property to be
rezoned, as taken from the latest assessment rolls prepared
by the County Assessor of Davis County.
F.

A filing fee of $50.00.

Upon receipt of petition by the Building and Zoning Department,
a copy shall be submitted to the office of the City Recorder for
filing, and a copy with all accompanying materials shall be forewarded to the City Planning Commission for their consideration of
the request. The Planning Commission shall hold a public hearing
in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 of this Chapter
before submitting their recommendations to the City Council.
Before recommending an amendment to this Title, it must be
shown that such amendment is necessary, is in the interest of the
public, and is in harmony with objectives and purposes of this
Title. Failure on the part of the Planning Commission to make
recommendation to the City Council within thirty (30) days after
hearing the petition shall be deemed to constitute approval of
such proposed amendments.
The fee provided herein shall not be returnable and shall be
applied to the General Fund to offset the cost of legal publications
notification of property owners, and the staff time involved in
researching the appropriateness of said request and its effect upon
the general welfare of the community.

11-2-3 VARIANCES - PROCEDURE. The B ^>ard of Adjustment may
authorize, upon appeal, such variances frop\ the terms of this Title
as will not be contrary to the public inte rest, where owing to the
special conditions the literal enforcement of the provisions of
this Title will result in unnecessary hard|sh ip; provided, that the
spirit of the Ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice
done. Before any variance may be authorise d however, it shall be
shown that:
A. The variance will not substantially affect the comprehensiv<
plan of zoning in the City and that qdherence to the strict
letter of the Ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships,
the imposition of which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in
order to carry out the general purpose of the plan.
B. Special circumstances attached to the property covered by
the application which do not generally apply to other properties in the same district.
C. That because of special circumstances, property covered
by this application is deprived of privileges possessed by
other properties in the same district; and that the granting
of the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial
property right possessed by other property in the same district
Applications for variance shall be f led with the Secretary
of the Board of Adjustment in the office <£>f the Building and Zoning
Department. Said application shall conta in the following informatio
A. A description of the requested v& riance, togther with a
designation of that Ordinance Provis on from which relief is
being requested.
B. An accurate plot plan, if appropriate, indicating the
manner in which the variance will be applied and its effect
upon adjacent properties.
C.

A filing fee of $50.00.

D. A list of property owners withinl three hundred (300) feet
of any property subject of the requested variance, contained
within the latest assessment rolls prepared by the County
Assessor of Davis County.
'
Upon receipt of application by the S pcretary of the Board of
Adjustment, a copy shall be submitted to the office of the City
Recorder for filing, and a copy with all [accompanying materials
shall be forwarded to the Board of Adjustment for their action upon
the request. The Board of Adjustment shall hold a public hearing
in accordance with procedures set forth i|n Section 11-2-1 of this
Chapter.

11-2-4:

CONDITIONAL USES,

11-2-4.1:

PURPOSE AND INTENT. The purpose and intent of conditional uses
is to allow in certain areas compatible integration of uses which
are related to the permitted uses of the zone, but which may be suitable and
desirable only in certain locations in that zone due to conditions and circumstances peculiar to that location and/or upon certain conditions which make
the uses suitable and/or only if such uses are designed, laid out, and constructed on the proposed site in a particular manner.
11-2-4.2:

CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. A Conditional Use Permit shall be required
for all uses listed as conditional uses in the zone regulations.
A Conditional Use Permit may be revoked by the City Council after review and
recommendation by the Planning Commission, upon failure to comply with the
conditions imposed with the original approval of the permit.
11-2-4.3:

REVIEW PROCEDURE.

A. Application for a Conditional Use Permit shall be made to the
City Planning Commission accompanied by a filing of $25.00 which fee shall be
non-refundable.
B. Detailed location, site and building plans, the name and address
of all property owners within a three-hundred (300) foot radius of boundaries
of the property shall accompany the complete application on a form provided by
the City.
C. All pertinent information shall be mailed to all property
owners within the three-hundred (300) foot radius of the subject property before
review by the Planning Commission. The application together with all pertinent
information will be considered by the Planning Commission at its next regularly
scheduled meeting.
D. The Planning Commission may call a specific Public Hearing on
any application after adequate notice if it is deemed in the public interest,
in which case, the Planning Commission shall take action on the application
by the second meeting of the Planning Commission, after the application filing
date.
11-2-4.4:

DETERMINATION. The Planning Commission may deny orpermit a
conditional use to_ be 1 ocated_wi thin^ anyl'zqne -in .wfr Jcfi the particula
co^itional.ui^
IaTauthc^izing^ny.xoadjtional..use, the Planning
Commissiqn_jshall impose juch requirements and conditions necessary for the
Projte&tJoa^O-fladgacent~JI£Q^
fare!."'
11-2-4.5:

BASIS FOR ISSUANCE OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. The Planning Commissi
shall not authorize a Conditional Use Permit unless evidence is
presented to establish:

A. That thp proposed use. of .th,e, partloilftt^JL^
4ry
or desirable to provide a service nr facility whirh will rontrihntP to the
general well-beingof the community^ and;

An Ordinance to Amend the Revised Ordinances of Clearfield City, 11-2-4-3.
Adopted by the City Council, September 22, 1981.
2
An Ordinance Amending the Revised Ordinances of Clearfield City, 11-2-4-3.
Adopted by the City Council, September 22, 1981.

B.
That such use will not, under the circumstances of the
particular case and the conditions imposed, be detrimental
to the health, safety and general welfare of persons or
injurious to property and improvement^ in the community,
but will be compatible with and complimentary to the ..existing
surrounding uses, buildings and structures when considering

psi-hpt-irs, p o l l u t i o n , p a r K i h q r landsgapJlnq iifM ^oca^ion p f
stmrl-nrp on prirrpl snfl Tigris,
C. That the proposed use will comply with the regulations
and conditions specified in this Ordinance for such use, and
D. That the proposed use conforms to the goals, policies,
intent and governing principles of th£ Clearfield City Master
Plan.

MJPO
11-2-4-6
CONDITIONS WHICH MAY BE IMPOSED
INCIDENT TO GRANTING
OF A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. Where thls Title contains
specific requirements which must be met as an incident of Conditional
Use Permit issuance, all such conditions must be met or adequate
assurance of compliance must be given to the local jurisdiction
prior to the issuance of such permit.
Where no specific requirements are contained in this Title
for the issuance of a Conditional Use Permit, one or more of the
following requirements or limitations may jbe imposed by the Plannninc
Commission as an incident to issuance of such permit.
A. Landscaping to insure compatibility with the intended
characteristics of the district as outlined in this Ordinance.
B.
Increased setback and side yard distances from lot lines
may be necessary to insure the publicp safety and to insure
compatibility with the intended characteristics of the district
as outlined in this Title.
C. The screening of yards or other preas as protection from
obnoxious land uses and activities.
D. The removal of structures, debri s, or plant life, incompati
ble with the intended characteristic!s of the district outlined
in this Ordinance.
E.
The relocation, covering or fenqing of irrigation ditches,
drainage channels, and similar potential attractive nuisances
as determined by the Planning Commission.
F. The relocation of proposed or existing structures as
necessary to provide for future streets on the major street pl<
of the local jurisdiction, adequate I sight distances for genera

safety, ground water control, or similar problems,
G. Construction of water mains, sewer mains, and drainage
facilities serving the proposed use, in sizes necessary to
protect existing utility users in the district and to provide
for an orderly development of land in the local jurisdiction,
H. The location, arrangement, and dimensions of truck loading
and unloading facilities.
I. The number, location, color, size, height, lighting, and
landscaping of outdoor advertising signs and structures in
relation to the creation of traffic hazards and"appearance
and harmony with adjacent development.
J. The location, height, and materials of walls, fences,
hedges, and screen plantings to insure harmony with adjacent
development, or to conceal storage areas, utility installations
or other unsightly development.
K. The planting of ground cover or other surfacing to
prevent dust and erosion.
L.

The retention of existing healthy trees and vegetation,

M. Construction of curbs, gutters, drainage culverts,
sidewalks, streets, fire hydrants, and street lighting which
serve the property in question and which may compensate in
part or in whole for possible adverse impacts to the district
from the proposed conditional use.
N. Restructuring of the land and planting of the same as
directed by the Planning Commission when the conditional use
involves cutting and/or filling the land and where such land
would be adversely affected if not restructured.
0.

Time limits on the validity of the Conditional Use Permit.

P. A bond or other valuable assurance in favor of the local
jurisdiction in an amount to be determined by the governing
body. The amount of said bond or other valuable assurance shall
not exceed the amount calculated by the developer's engineer
.and approved by the local engineer as necessary to assure
compliance with all conditions.
Q.

Specific short and long range plans of development.

R. Certification obtained and furnished by the applicant
indicating that the proposed conditional u£e will meet and

comply with standards set by the Envi rjonmental Protection
Agency and by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
S. Limitations and/or restrictions on the use and/or location
of uses due to special site conditions including but not
limited to geologically hazardous are^s; flood plains;
fault zones; land slide areas; and sensitive areas due to
soil capabilities, wildlife and plant life.
T. Population density and intensity <bf land uses may be
limited where land capability and/or vicinity relationships
make it appropriate to do so to protect health, safety and
welfare.
U, Provision for or construction of recreational facilities
necessary to satisfy needs of the con itional use.
V. Finish floor elevations and grading plans to prevent or
minimize water damage from flood leve|Is as determined by
hydrology studies.
W. A public hearing when deemed by the Planning Commission
to be in the public interest. Howeve r, in the following
instances the holding of a public hearing shall be mandatory:
(1) The Planning Commission determines that existing
streets and thoroughfares are not suitable and adequate
to carry anticipated traffic, and increased densities
resulting from the proposed use'may generate traffic in
such amounts as to overload theistreet network outside
the district.
(2) The Planning Commission determines that increases
in miscellaneous traffic, light, odor, and environmental
pollution generated by the proposed use may significantly
change the intended characteris tics of the district as
outlined in this Ordinance.
(3) The Planning Commission determines that the architectural design of the proposedj use varies significantly
from the architectural characteristics of the district
(as outlined in this Ordinance)! in which such use is
proposed.
(4) There are no specific requirements for the
conditional use in this Ordinance
X. Any other reasonable condition vfhich will serve to
maintain the intended characteristics of a district as outline*
in this Ordinance and to compensate for possible adverse
impacts to the district from the proposed conditional use.

11-2-4-7. APPEAL, Any person shall have the right to appeal
to the City Council any decision rendered by the Planning Commission
by filing, in writing and in triplicate, the reasons for said
appeal with said City Council at any regular meeting thereof within
fifteen (15) days following the date upon which the decision from
which appeal is being taken is made by the Planning Commission.
A. Notification of Planning Commission. The City Council
shall notify the Planning Commission of the date of said
review in writing at least seven (7) days preceeding said
date set for hearing so that said Planning Commission may
prepare the record for said hearing,
B. Determination of City Council. The City Council, after
proper review of the decision of the Planning Commission, may
affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further review and consideration any action taken by said Planning Commission and
shall make such decision within thirty (30) days of the hearing
of the appeal.
11-2-4-8. BUILDING PERMIT. Following the issuance of a
Conditional Use Permit, the Building Inspector shall review the
permit and the conditions attached. Based on this review and
compliance with any other items that might develop in the pursuance
of his duties, the Building Inspector any approve an application
for a Building Permit and shall insure that development is undertaken
and completed in compliance with said Conditional Use Permit and
Building Permit.
11-2-4-9. EXPIRATION. Unless there is substantial action
under a Conditional Use Permit within a period of one year of its
issuance, the Conditional Use Permit shall expire. The Planning
Commission may grant a single extension not to exceed six months
under exceptional circumstances.
11-2-4-10. MODIFICATION OR REVOCATION OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT
The City Council, on its own motion or by recommendation of
the Planning Commission, may hold a hearing upon the question of
modification or revocation of a Conditional Use Permite granted under
or pursuant to the provisions of this section. Notice of said hearing shall be made in a manner prescribed by Section 11-2-1 of this
Chapter. A Conditional Use Permit may be modified or revoked if the
City Council finds one or more of the following:
1.
That the use is detrimental to the public health, safety,
or welfare or is a nuisance.
o

That the use permit:

was obtained by fraud.

3. That the use for which the permit was granted is not
being exercised.
4. That the use for which the use permit was granted has
ceased or has been suspended for six (6) months.
5. That the 'conditions imposed upon said use permit have
not been complied with.
6. That there is a violation of other laws or ordinances
of the City which have a direct bearing upon the conduct of
the conditional use and/or its comparability with other
surrounding uses.
11-2-5 APPEALS. Appeals from actions or decisions of
Clearfield City Officers, Officials, or Advisory Agencies may be
made in conformance with the following provisions:
A. Appeals to the Board of Adjustment. Appeals to the Board
of Adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any
Officer, Department, Board of Bureau of Municipality affected
by any decision by the Administrative Officer. Such appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days of said action or
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Officer from
whom the appeal is taken or with the Board of Adjustment.
Said Notice of Appeal shall specify the grounds of the
appeal and circumstances related thereto. The Officer from
whom the appeal was taken shall forthwith transmit to the
Board of Adjustment all papers constituting the record upon
which the action appealed from was taken.
(Ref. Appeals to Board 10-9-9 U.C.A., 1953)
An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action
appealed from unless the Officer from whom the appeal is taken
certifies to the Board of Adjustment after the Notice of Appea."
shall have been filed with him that by reason of facts stated
in the Certificate a stay would, in his opinion, cause imminen'
peril to life or property. In such case, proceedings shall no
be stayed otherwise than by restraining order which may be
granted by the Board of Adjustment <j>r by the District Court
on application and notice and on due cause shown.
(Ref. Stay of Proceedings pending appeal 10-9-10
U.C.A., 1953)
The Board of Adjustment shall set a public hearing on the
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1
of this Chapter. Upon the hearing, any party may appear in
person or by agent or by attorney.
In exercising its powers, the Board of Adjustment may reverse
or affirm, wholly or partly or may modify the order requiremer
decision or determination appealed from and may make such ord<
requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made, a;
to that end shall have all of the powers of the officer from

whom the appeal is taken. The concurring vote of three (3)
members of the Board shall be necessary to reverse any
order, requirement or determination of any such administrative
official, or to decide in favor of the appellant on any matter
upon which it is required to pass under any such ordinance,
or to affect any variation in such Ordinance.
(Ref. Decision on appeal - vote necessary for reversal
10-9-13 and 10-9-14, U.C.A., 1953)
B. Appeals to the City Council. Appeals to the City Council
may be taken by any person 'aggrieved or affected by any
decision of the City Planning Commission, Such an appeal may
be made within fifteen (15) days of the time of the decision of
the said Planning Commission by filing a notice of appeal with
the office of the City Recorder. The City Recorder shall then
forthwith transmit to the City Council all of the papers and
records related to the action from which the appeal is taken*
The Clearfield City Council shall set a public hearing on the
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 of
this Chapter. All persons having any interest in the appeal
may appear in person or be represented at the hearing.
The City Council may confirm or overrule the decision of the
Planning Commission, or may make such amendments to the
decision as it may deem appropriate.
C. Judicial Appeal. Any person aggrieved by or affected by
any decision of the Board of Adjustment or the City Council
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom
in any court of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition
for such relief is presented to the Court within thirty (30)
days after the filing of such decision in the office of the
Board of Adjustment or with the City Recorder.
(Ref. Judicial Review of Board's Decision 10-9-15,
U.C.A., 1953)
11-2-6 ANNEXED TERRITORY - ZONING. Any property which, for
any reason is not designated on the official zoning map as being
classified in any of the zones established hereby, or any property
in the process of annexation, or annexed to or consolidated to the
City of Clearfield subsequent to the effective date of this Chapter,
shall be deemed to be classified comparably to existing County
Zoning until the same shall have been otherwise classified in the
manner set forth in Section 11-2-2 of this Chapter subsequent to
annexation.
In order to insure due process and to protect the rights of
the citizens of Clearfield City, property shall not be reclassified
to a zone of more intense use concurrently with or prior to
completion of annexation proceedings, unless otherwise requested
by the property owner(s) nor shall any Officer or Official of
Clearfield City utilize reclassification committments as a medium
of bargaining for the annexation of property in Clearfield City.
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10-9-2.5

10-9-2.5. Residential facility for handicapped persons permitted in municipal zoning district — Conditions
for qualification.
A residential facility for handicapped persons shall be permitted in any
municipal zoning district, subject to the conditional review process, except a
district zoned to permit, exclusively, single family dwelling use, if the facility
conforms to all applicable health, safety, and building codes and is capable of
use as a residential facility for handicapped perspns without structural alteration which would change the residential character of the structure. For purposes of this section "zoned to permit exclusive^ single family dwelling use**
means that the applicable ordinance prohibits the occupancy of a housing
structure by any more than one family.
A municipality, by ordinance, may provide ttyat no residential facility for
handicapped persons may be established or maintained within one miie of
another existing facility.
The use granted and permitted by this section is nontransferable and terminates if the structure is devoted to a use other than as a residential facility for
handicapped persons or, if the structure fails to comply with applicable
health, safety, and building codes.
The governing body of each municipality ujider locally adopted criteria
shall adopt zoning ordinances which permit, thitough the grant of conditional
use permits, the establishment and maintenance of residential facilities for
handicapped persons within districts zoned to permit exclusively single family
dwelling use. Such ordinances may require that no residential facility for
handicapped persons be established or maintained within one mile of another
existing facility. Those ordinances shall prohibit discrimination against residential facilities for handicapped persons.
No person who is being treated for alcoholism or drug abuse shall be placed
in a residential facility for handicapped persons. Placement shall be on a
strictly voluntary basis and shall not be a pari of or in lieu of confinement,
rehabilitation, or treatment in a custodial or correctional type institution
For purposes of this section, "residential facility for handicapped person"
means a single-family dwelling structure that is occupied on a 24-hour per
day basis by eight or less handicapped persons in a family-type arrangement
under the supervision of house parents or a rtianager. The facility shal be
operated or licensed and regulated by a state Agency and if not so operated,
licensed, or regulated, it shall comply with all ^tate standards for group home
operations.
For purposes of this section, "handicapped person" means a person wh: is
nonviolent and who has a severe, chronic disability attributable to a mental or
physical impairment or to a combination of mental and physical impairments
which is likely to continue indefinitely and ivhich results in a substantia!
functional limitation in three or more of th0 following areas of major life
activity: self-care, receptive and expressive language, learning, mobility selfdirection, capacity for independent living, economic self-sufficiency; and who
requires a combination or sequence of special interdisciplinary or generic
care, treatment, or other services that are individually planned and coordinated to allow the person to function in, and contribute to, a residential neighborhood.
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